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Religion and Ethnicity in Developing Labour Markets
by Sarah Khan
This Ph.D. thesis looks at the effects of religion and ethnicity in developing labour
markets. The first and second chapter take a step towards understanding the impact of
terrorist activities in north-western Pakistan since 2007. The increased insurgency in the
north-western regions of Pakistan threatened the educational attainment of young girls
and boys, with the Taliban specifically targeting the education of girls. The empirical
strategy uses a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, comparing the differences
in education and labour market outcomes across three dimensions, gender, years, and
district. I first estimate the gender differential for total school enrolment in the affected
districts. Second, estimate the impact on enrolment in religious schools. Last, I look
at the gender differential in labour market by age and marital status. The results
suggest that the impact of these terrorist attacks was relatively modest and short-lived
for both education and labour market outcomes. The third chapter uses the Ghana
Living Standards Survey 2005 to empirically analyse the employment outcomes of ethnic
minorities in Ghanaian labour market. In the to less-developed regions, the absence of
paid work opportunities has resulted in ethnic groups entering self employment. Non-
dominant groups residing in ethnic enclaves are pulled into non-farm self-employment
where access to credit and family workers are important determinants of entry into
entrepreneurship.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There exists a growing economic literature that examines the effects of ethnicity and reli-
gion on conflict and economic development (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) (Bosker
and de Ree, 2014) (J Esteban and Ray, 2012). An important catalyst for this litera-
ture has been the global rise of Islamic terrorism and internal ethnic conflicts in recent
decades. Along with low investment, high population, and low level of education, reli-
gious and ethnic strife could also be a major cause of poor economic performance and
political instability. Ethnic and religious divisions can challenge the cohesion within of
a state as well as between states. Therefore, it is important to empirically examine the
economic consequences of religious and ethnic violence on the targeted groups, and un-
derstand household and individual behaviour; as such insights could be used in targeting
affected populations with social and economic policies.
Religious and ethnic divisions have been linked to conflicts by forming social cleavages
that can develop into violence. Horowitz and Lijphart claim that religious differences
are more important than other differences (language, ethnicity, or race) as a social
cleavage, as religion is exclusive and is a stronger sign of identity (Horowitz, 1985)
(Lijphart, 1984). High religious and ethnic tensions can be found in Lebanon, Israel,
Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia where there are conflicts among ethnic groups, in Malaysia
between Christians and Muslims, in South Asia between different sects of Islam (Shia vs.
Sunni), Myanmar where Rohingya Muslims have faced a genocide, and recent violence
in Iraq and Levant with the rise of Wahabi Islam. Moreover, radical groups like the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in
Nigeria, the Benghazi rebels in Libya, and the ISIS in Iraq have occupied important
territories in these countries, where these groups have been known to practice ethnic
1
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cleansing1, abduction of women2, killing foreign workers3, and large-scale intimidation
of the public. The US and Allied forces have been at war with extremist elements within
these countries for over a decade now.
Terrorism and violence displaces people, destroys capital and infrastructure, disrupts
schooling, and limits mobility of the affected population. Volatile regions of a coun-
try under conflict can experience gender differentials in educational and labour market
outcomes. Due to destruction of industry and infrastructure, there may be limited op-
portunities for skilled work, in which case it makes more economic sense to educated
boys rather than girls, as men are more likely to take better paying jobs in develop-
ing countries (Shemyakina, 2010). Existing literature shows that conflict effects females
disproportionately; women and girls are made worse off relative to men in terms of
education, labour market and marriage outcomes (Valente, 2001) (Alderman and Kin-
sey, 2004) (T. Bru¨ck and Verwimp, 2010) (Shemyakina, 2010). In countries experiencing
religious violence, women’s mobility and freedom have been specifically targeted4. More-
over, violence also increases mortality risks and income shocks, decreases the quality of
education, and a subsequent increase in child labour (Chamarbagwala and Mora´n, 2008)
(Prieto-Rodriguez and Rodriguez-Gutierrez, 2003) (Shemyakina, 2010). Households can
change labour allocations, where child labour can be used as an economic security to
compensate for income losses during war time. These children can be removed from
school which reduces the stock of human capital resulting in loss of long-term welfare of
the family.
Also, as religious/ethnic schism increases, this can lead to antagonism, hostility, and
discrimination towards the minorities. For instance, in the absence of government regu-
lations and management practices in the labour market, majority group members may
discriminate against the minority groups, leading to wage differentials where the minor-
ity groups are rewarded less for the same jobs and the same level of worker endowments.
As a result, the economic divide between minority and majority members widens. That
is, as the population of a minority group within the labour market increases, so does the
likelihood of discriminatory practices in the labour market (Semyonov, 1988) (Bonacich,
1976) (Black, 1995) (Arrow, 1973) (Becker, 1971) (Barr and Oduro, 2000).
This PhD thesis contributes to several strands of studies in education and labour eco-
nomics, and the economics of terrorism. First, it adds to the literature studying the effect
of terrorism on educational attainment and the labour market in developing countries.
Second, it adds to the literature on Islamic schooling in Pakistan. Last, it contributes
1 Yazidis have been known to be killed by ISIS in recent months.
2 Boko Haram is currently holding hundreds of girls as hostages
3US ambassador, J. Christopher Stevens, was killed in Benghazi in 2012.
4 The Taliban have a history of banning women in public in Pakistan and Afghanistan
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to the literature of ethnic enclaves in developing labour market of Ghana. The chapters
are summarized below.
The Taliban insurgency in the north-western regions of Pakistan specifically threatened
the participation of women in the labour market and education, as one of the main
goals of their terror campaign was to keep women at home. Women’s socio-economic
outcomes in Pakistan had seen a steady improvement in the decade prior to the start of
the insurgency in 2007. The actions of the Taliban were therefore seen as a threat to the
improvement in Pakistani women’s future socio-economic status. The first two chapters
after the introduction take a step towards understanding the impact of terrorist activities
in north-western Pakistan on women’s human capital development and accumulation,
with the Taliban specifically targeting working women and girls over age 10 in educa-
tion. The spatial and time-based variation in intensity of violence is used to identify the
effects of terrorism on the educational attainment and labour market outcomes of young
girls and women. The empirical strategy uses a difference-in-difference-in-difference
approach, comparing the differences in enrolment and employment across three dimen-
sions, gender, district, and years. I estimate the impact of these attacks by using five
consecutive rounds of the Pakistan Social and Living Standards survey (PSLM) from
the years 2004 to 2009. This data is merged with data on the total number of terrorist
attacks and the number of attacks on educational institutions compiled from the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD) and the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP).
The main results of this analysis are as follows. First, there is a relatively small effect on
the estimated enrolment probabilities for girls aged 10-14 during 2007-08, the years of
highest-intensity terrorist attacks. In the following year of 2008-09, when the Pakistani
military retook control over some of the affected areas, this effect fades away, suggesting
that students returned to schools as soon control was regained in the most-affected areas.
Moreover, there is no evidence of dramatic increases in religious school enrolment rates,
pointing at failed intimidation attempts of the Taliban. Second, there is no evidence for
a substantial drop in the labour force participation rates in the worst affected districts.
There is a relatively small effect estimated for women in paid employment in the years
of highest-intensity terrorist attacks, followed by a rapid return to normality in overall
employment after the Pakistan Army counterinsurgency measures in 2009.
The third chapter looks at the influence of ethnicity on the decision to enter self em-
ployment in Ghana and the push/pull factors which affect the rewards in the different
sectors of employment. First, I look into factors that drive ethnic minorities out of for-
mal sector employment. I test whether Non-Akans living in Akan-majority regions suffer
from detrimental consequences of socio-economic discrimination more than those living
in Non-Akan majority regions. Next, I estimate the influence of ethnicity on the decision
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to enter non-farm self-employment and earnings in the non-farm informal sector. Lastly,
I test for the impact of ethnic enclaves, defined following Portes and Wilson as a cluster
of individuals from an ethnic group who reside within the same geographical location,
on labour market outcomes - How does living in an enclave affect labour market out-
comes for the non-dominant groups (Wilson, 1980)? If enclaves are important for self
employment, the likelihood of being self-employed would be higher if an individual from
a non-dominant group lives in an enclave.
Chapter 2
The Taliban and Girls’ Schooling
The Impact of School Bombings on
Access to Education: Evidence from
North-western Pakistan
2.1 Introduction
Since Pakistan became a United States ally in the War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks
on New York and Washington, terrorist incidents in the country have resulted in around
50,000 deaths of civilian and army personnel. In addition, over 2 million Pakistanis
have been displaced due to military operations in troubled areas (SAT, 2014). The
National Counterterrorism Centre’s Report on Terrorism shows that, in 2011, Pakistan
experienced 1,436 terrorist incidents, 68 percent of the total in South Asia and 17 percent
of the world’s total, a figure only surpassed by Afghanistan and Iraq (NCTC, 2012).
These incidents include numerous forms of violence against civilians, from suicide/bomb
attacks on private citizens to destructions of schools. The terrorist attacks on girls’
schools in north-western Pakistan have caught the attention of the world in recent years.
Although the enrolment rate of girls has always been below that of boys, it has seen a
considerable increase between 1999 and 2007 where girls’ literacy rates have increased
from 32 percent to 42 percent (SDPI, 2008). The targeting of female education by the
Taliban was therefore seen as a threat to the improvement in female schooling and future
economic and social status.
The microeconomic impact of terrorism on civilian populations can be substantial and
persistent. Not only do people living in troubled areas suffer injuries and have their
5
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property destroyed, they may also be displaced from their towns, lose their means of
livelihood, or be unable to attend school, all of which may result in a permanent de-
cline in their stock of human capital and earnings. Furthermore, since war costs tend
to be disproportionately borne by the underprivileged and most vulnerable populations,
conflict may intensify poverty and inequality (Chamarbagwala and Mora´n, 2008). Un-
derstanding the short-term and longer-term economic consequences of terrorism is thus
important for implementing post-conflict reconstruction/rehabilitation efficiently and
helping identify those populations that reconstruction policy should target.
Although men are typically more affected by direct conflict-related death, in Pakistan’s
case women face more challenges as the terrorists have specifically targeted women and
their mobility. Since the rise of the Taliban in the areas adjacent to Afghanistan, they
have aimed at barring girls and young women from attending schools and colleges by
sending threatening letters to schools, blowing up school buildings, and attacking women
who defied the ban. There was a sharp increase in attacks on educational institutions
from 2007, most of which were girls’ schools (GTD data). Mainstream news reports
and international articles claim that these attacks led to the closure of 900 schools,
denying access to over 120,000 female students (IRIN, 2004). By the spring of 2009, the
military operation in Swat districts led to the end of the Taliban’s anti-female education
campaign. However, there were some reports of continued bombings in rural areas of
Peshawar and surrounding districts of Mardan and Charsadda towards 2010.
This paper looks gender specific effects of terrorism on educational attainment in north-
western Pakistan. The variation in intensity of violence, measured in number of schools
attacked in each district of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa over time, is used to identify the
effect of terrorism on the educational attainment of girls and young women. I estimate
the impact of targeted attacks of the Pakistani Taliban on the educational attainment
and labour market outcomes of Pakistani women using five consecutive rounds of the
Pakistan Social and Living Standards survey (PSLM) from the years 2004 to 2009.
This data is merged with data on attacks on educational institutions compiled from the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP). My
first estimation looks at the effects of attacks on schools on the enrolment rates of both
boys and girls in the age groups of 3-9, 10-14, and 15-18 years. Special consideration is
given to the districts of Swat and Peshawar, which experienced the most incidents and
which have dominated media accounts of the conflict. The second estimation looks at the
effects of these attacks on enrolment rates of madrassas (Islamic schools). The Taliban’s
letters demanded that children should be removed from secular schools and enrolled in
madrassas. If parents perceived that these threats were credible, I would expect to see
a drop in overall enrolment after the bombings, but an increase in enrolment rates of
religious schools.
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the history of the Pakistan
conflict and the Taliban’s campaign against female education. Section 2.3 presents
previous research on the impact of civil war and terrorism on educational attainment.
Section 2.4 describes the data while the empirical strategy and results of the estimation
are presented in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Pakistan and Terrorism: Background
Pakistan is administratively divided into the semi-autonomous Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) in the northwest and four provinces - Punjab, Sindh, Balochis-
tan, and Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa – which contain a total of administrative 102 districts
(PSLM). Towards the northwest, Pakistan shares a 2,430 km (1,509.9 mile) border with
Afghanistan in the provinces of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa and Balochistan, known as the
Durand line (Figure 2.1). Due to its proximity with the Afghan border, the province of
KPK has suffered the most attacks from the militant insurgency (Hassan, 2008).
Even before the rise of the Taliban in the north-west, Pakistan’s women were compar-
atively disadvantaged in terms of human development. The female participation rate
in 2003-04 was 15.9 percent out of the total Labour Force Participation Rate of 43.7
percent with the rural rate at 19.5 percent and urban at 9.4 percent1. According to
Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLMS) 2004-05 the total
literacy rate for Pakistan (age 10 years and above) was 53 percent. Of this literate males
were 65 percent and females 40 percent, revealing a gender gap of 25 percent. In rural
areas only 29 percent females were literate. As for more recent figures, only 18.3 percent
of adult women have reached a secondary or higher level of education compared to 43.1
percent of their male counterparts. The female labour market participation rate is 22.7
percent compared to 83.3 percent for men. Pakistan has a Gender Inequality Index
value of 0.567, ranking it 123 out of 148 countries in the 2012 index (UNDP, 2012).
Pakistani Taliban: Formally known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the group is
very closely linked with the Afghani Taliban and al Qaeda through similar religious
extremist ideology and shared heritage. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,
fighters from Pakistan crossed over the border to fight alongside the Afghani Taliban
(Hassan, 2008).
After joining the War on Terror in 2001, Pakistan’s army began hunting various mil-
itant groups that had their hideouts in the semi-autonomous regions along Pakistan’s
border with Afghanistan. In reaction, militant supporters of the Afghan Taliban in
1Pakistan Labour Force Survey, 2003-04
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the tribal areas transitioned into a mainstream Taliban force of their own. In 2007,
like-minded militias in Pakistan’s tribal region came together under the command of
Baitullah Mehsud from the Mehsud tribe of South Waziristan. The TTP may have
started in the tribal regions, but have since expanded their network into settled areas
of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa and Punjab provinces. Whereas the TTP are predominantly
a Pashtoon group, they are not solely composed of Pashtoon fighters. They draw mem-
bership from all of FATA’s seven agencies as well as several settled districts of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab. Punjabi Taliban, an alliance of militant groups that were
active in Kashmir that fought in the insurgency in Kashmir, have also joined forces
with the TTP. With close to 2,000 men, the Punjabi Taliban mostly carry out attacks
inside settled areas of Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban also receive support from Arab,
Chechen, Uzbek, and other foreign fighters, many of whom settled inside FATA after
the Soviet-Afghan War because they could not return to their own countries or came to
FATA after the NATO invasion in Afghanistan. They have also been joined by criminal
gangs to raise money through kidnappings and extortion (Hassan, 2008).
Their primary targets of the Taliban are the Pakistani state and it’s military. The
ultimate goal of their insurgency is to overthrow the government via a terrorist campaign
and impose Sharia law (strict Islamic law) in Pakistan. Because of Pakistan’s alliances
with the United States and NATO, the Pakistani Taliban has also attacked foreign
interests inside and outside of Pakistan. Within Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban often target
members of Pakistan’s armed forces but also target politicians and civilians. Two-time
Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto and teen blogger Malala Yousafzai perhaps their most
prominent targets. A Tehrik-i-Taliban militia led by Maulana Fazlullah controlled the
Swat region until they were overthrown by a military operation in summer of 2009. In
early 2009, Malala Yousafzai wrote a blog entry exposing how a decree in forbidding girls
from attending school was enforced by Tehrik-i-Taliban and the targeting of schools in
her region. On October 9 2012, Taliban gunmen halted a van transporting her and other
children home from school, found Malala and shot her in the head and neck. When she
survived her injuries, a TTP spokesman promised that they would “finish the job the
next time”2. Malala was recently the Nobel Peace Prize for her fight against extremism.
Spillover into Pakistan - What determines where the Taliban are active: After the NATO
forces toppled the Taliban regime in Kabul in the aftermath of September 11 2001, the
Taliban regrouped a sizable contingent of forces along the Pak-Afghan border, 2500
k.m. of rugged mountainous territory with numerous mountain passes and difficult
routes linking Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are in most cases known only to the
locals. The Taliban reappearance in Pakistan has taken place in areas that adjoin the
Taliban’s traditional strongholds in Afghanistan. Helmand, a remote southern province
2CNN 2012,‘’Who are the Pakistani Taliban?” Ben Brumfield
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of Afghanistan, is one such area, where the Taliban have a heavy influence. This area is
adjacent to the Pakistani territory of the Noshki-Chaghai region in Balochistan province,
where the Taliban have found refuge among local tribes. Also, North and South Waziris-
tan are adjacent to Khost and Paktika provinces in Afghanistan, where in the latter,
NATO forces have several checkposts and a compound. Reportedly, there are 243 illegal
passages in North Waziristan by which it is possible to enter Afghanistan, while there
are only five check posts on the border in this area. Similarly, Quetta city in Balochis-
tan, Pakistan is near Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the Taliban have a presence in the
neighbouring Afghan countryside. The outskirts of Quetta have become a safe haven
for such groups. Whenever the Pakistani army starts operations within its borders,
terrorists move from one side of the Pakistani border to the other (Zaidi, 2010).
The insurgency, which was initially limited to North and South Waziristan, spread dur-
ing the next few years throughout FATA, including the agencies of Khyber, Orakzai,
Kurram, Bajaur, and Mohmand. Moreover, several rebel militias emerged between 2002
and 2006 in the settled areas of Swat and Darra Adam Khel in KPK. By 2007, the Swat
district had also fallen under rebel control, and within two years the Pakistani Taliban
controlled towns located a mere sixty miles away from Islamabad.
The main determinent of the terrorist activities in an area depends on the proximity
from the tribal areas. In figure 2.3, it can be observed that the number of terrorist
attacks are more frequent in the areas adjacent to the tribal areas. As the distance of
the tribal areas increases, the number of terrorist incidents reported in the GTD data
goes down. In addition to its presence in these areas, reports indicate that the TTP
has also made their presence felt settled metropolitan areas by reaching targets in all
provinces (Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Lahore, Multan, Karachi, and
Quetta). They have also attacked security forces inside the Pakistani controlled region
of Kashmir (Qazi, 2011).
Taliban activities in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa province: Since Pakistan joined the War on
Terror in 2001, Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa has experienced the greatest amount of extremist
violence out of all the regions in Pakistan. In comparison to the unsettled tribal belt,
where Pakistan’s security forces face the brunt of attacks from Taliban, the types and
nature of attacks in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa have a different focus: to set up micro-
emirates in the province where they enforce an extremist version of religious ideals
(O’Malley, 2010). For instance, recent targets included a population welfare office in
Swabi, bomb attacks on girls’ schools and sending threatening letters to boys’ schools
asking them to join madrassas instead of public schools, destruction of historical sites
containing rocks engraved with Buddha images, attacks on video and music shops, and
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attacks on barber shops due to their practice of shaving beards 3 4 5. To drive the
Taliban out of Swat Valley, Operation Rah-e-Rast II began in January 2009 and involved
the Pakistani Army and Taliban militants in a fight for control of the Swat district of
Pakistan. The operation ended in July 2009 with Pakistan army taking control of the
district.
This paper is primarily concerned with attacks on girls’ schools. UNESCO’s Education
under Attack has documented hundreds of fire bombings and suicide attacks on schools,
particularly in the Swat district of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa province. The Taliban started
bombing girls’ schools in parts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa province in early 2007. From
2007 to March 2009, hundreds schools were either damaged or completely destroyed by
attacks. The targets of attacks included different types of schools, although girls’ schools
were often singled out. Initially, public threats by the Taliban warning of attacks on all
girls’ schools were sent out demanding a ban of girls’ education beyond age 9. The only
cohort that would have been negatively impacted would be girls in secondary schooling
in the ages of 10 and beyond as older girls in the Pushtoon culture observe purdah6 and
are restricted from higher education even in the presence of high schools/colleges. Even
in the absence of terrorism, enrolment rates for girls in older cohorts are expected to be
lower due to restrictions of purdah in the strict Pushtoon culture.
Letters were sent out to girls’ school demanding that students wear burqas, which then
progressed to demands for closure of girls’ schools. These threats were then followed
by bombing school buildings, usually in the middle of the night. In Swat district alone,
from 2007 to March 2009, 116 girls’ schools and 56 boys’ schools were destroyed or
damaged7. Throughout 2008, the attacks on girls’ schools spread to districts adjacent
to Swat, including Dir, Peshawar, Mardan, Charsadda, Bannu, and the tribal regions
of FATA and North Waziristan (tribal areas are not included in my dataset). Popular
press articles and media reports claim that the incidents of terrorist attacks lead to the
closure of 900 government and private schools and a fall in enrolment rates for girls
from 120,000 in 2007 to just 50,000 in 20098. The ”fall” is generally attributed to fear
amongst parents and teachers that their girls might be attacked. Yet while these reports
claim the success of the Taliban campaign, none of the reports base their analysis on
3Reza Sayah, “Pakistan: Bomb Destroys Girls’ School,” CNN, July 25, 2008.
4“Tailor’s Shop Blown Up in Bajaur,” Daily Times, September 7, 2007
5This was inspired by the destruction of the Bamiyan statues. The Buddhas of Bamiyan were two 6th
century monumental statues of Buddha carved into the side of a cliff in Bamiyan, central Afghanistan.
In March 2001, these statues were destroyed by the Taliban (USA Today, 2001).
6Purdah is a religious and social practice of female seclusion prevalent among some Muslim commu-
nities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Northern India. More simply, it is the practice of preventing men
from seeing women. This takes two forms: physical segregation of the sexes and the requirement that
women cover their bodies so as to cover their skin and conceal their form.
7Akhtar Amin, “Militants Destroyed 125 Girls’ Schools in 10 Months,” Daily Times, August 21, 2008.
8IRIN News, “Pakistan: Swat Militants Driving Girls Out of School,” January 20, 2009
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publically available data sources or established statistical methodologies. They have
only provided anecdotal evidence for their claims9 (O’Malley, 2010).
2.3 Literature - Previous Work on Gender-Specific Effects
of Armed Conflicts
The micro level consequences of conflict are relatively under-researched area with most
focus on macro-economic effects of conflicts. This is due to a lack of large-scale, high
quality data for countries under conflict and because it is difficult to collect data from
a country that just emerged from conflict (Justino, 2011). Very few micro-level socio-
economic surveys in conflict-affected countries explicitly acknowledge the prior existence
of violent conflict in those countries when designing sampling frames and formal ques-
tionnaires. Questionnaires used in standard household surveys implemented in countries
affected by violence and conflict (e.g. Nigeria, Indonesia, Colombia, Rwanda, South
Africa, and Liberia) rarely feature questions capturing the causes and consequences of
violence in the lives of those affected by violent conflict. For instance, these surveys rarely
include questions specifically about conflict-related migration or evacuation. Even when
they do, these questions are not implemented in a way which allows consistent com-
parisons across different settings or over time (T. Bru¨ck and Verwimp, 2010). When
reliable data is available, it is difficult to identify whether household behaviour was a
reaction to conflict directly or other economic conditions that took place simultaneously.
A related issue is that most existing surveys are cross-sectional, and thus cannot be used
for difference-in-difference estimation.
Justino outlines three consistent patterns that emerge as a result of violence interrupting
education. First, minor shocks to schooling can lead to long term consequences on the
educational attainment, health outcomes, and labour market outcomes of the affected
cohort. Second, when conflict leads to destruction of education infrastructure, there is a
negative effect for secondary education but not primary education. Third, conflict can
produce gender differentials in educational and labour market outcomes (Justino, 2011).
Regarding long term consequences of violence, Akbuluut-Yuksel uses a difference-in-
difference to examine the effects of allied bombings during World War II on the schooling
and health of German children. He finds that those who resided in heavily targeted
cities had significantly fewer years of schooling and were one centimetre shorter than
children of same age in non-targeted areas (Akbulut-Yuksel, 2009). Next, the pattern of
9There are only news reports about closing down of schools. Most are anonymous interview with
education department officials. All reports give different figures for number of schools bombed or number
of girls affected. The only official data which I can use here is the GTD data on incidents of attack
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destruction of education infrastructure was observed for Bosnia by Swee, who finds that
the civil war of 1992-1995 led to a decrease in the likelihood that students completed
secondary schooling, but had no significant effects on primary education. He argues that
child soldier recruitment was the main determinant of these results (Swee, 2009). Chen,
Loayza, and Reynal-Querol find that the average recovery rate in post-conflict countries
during the period 1960-2003 was smaller for secondary-school enrolment than for primary
enrolment (Loayza and Reynal-Querol., 2008). Similar studies by Miguel and Roland,
and Stewart et. al. suggest that countries with strong institutions can recover pre-
conflict enrolment rates once war dies down. Stewart et. al. used a sample of eighteen
African economies under civil war and find that primary school enrolments decreased
in only three out of eighteen countries in their sample but improved in five countries
during civil war (Stewart and Wang, 2001). A similar effect is found by Miguel and
Roland who study the long-term impact of US bombing on the economic development
in Vietnam (Miguel and Roland, 2006). Akresh and de Walque find that school age
children exposed to the genocide experienced a drop in educational achievement of almost
half a year of completed schooling, and were 15 percent less likely to complete 3rd
or 4th grade (Akresh and de Walque, 2008). Lastly, regarding gender differentials in
educational outcomes, Shemyakina finds that during the Tajikistan armed conflict of
1992-1998, girls who were exposed to conflict experienced a significant reduction in
enrolment rates while there was little or no effect on the enrolment of boys. School
aged girls residing in conflict-ridden regions were 12.3 percent less likely to complete
mandatory schooling as compared to girls who completed their schooling before the
conflict started. Furthermore, Shemyakina finds that the probability of completing the
compulsory ninth grade is 4 percent lower for boys and 7 percent lower for girls. These
results suggest that households affected by conflict invested more in the schooling of
boys, for whom there is less perceived risk of violence, harassment or abduction. Due to
the destruction of industries and infrastructure, job opportunities for skilled labour may
become scarce, in which case it may make more economic sense to educate boys as they
may be more likely than girls to take up higher paid jobs (Shemyakina, 2006). Similarly,
Chamarbagwal and Moran examine the effects of the Guatemala civil war of 1979 using
an empirical strategy which exploits variation in conflict intensity across regions. They
find that during the peak conflict years (1979-1984), girls had 0.55 years less education
while boys had 0.13 year less education in areas worst hit by conflict. The authors argue
that internal displacement and destruction of property led families to reallocate scarce
resources towards the primary education of boys. While both boys and girls received
less secondary education due to civil war, the effects were more pronounced for girls
(Chamarbagwala and Mora´n, 2008).
Chapter 2. The Taliban and Girls’ Schooling in Northwest Pakistan 13
Causal mechanisms that link violence and educational outcome during conflicts:
The literature discussed in this section show a clear negative consequences of violence and
conflict on the human capital accumulation of households in affected regions. However,
there is little consensus on the causal mechanisms that explain the negative link between
conflict/terrorism and schooling outcomes. Identifying the mechanisms that uphold this
negative relationship between conflict and educational outcomes are crucial towards
designing and executing policies to ensure these negative effects can be diminished.
The types of mechanisms that explain the negative effects of conflict on schooling are
discussed as under.
First, households in affected regions can reallocate labour; using child labour to com-
pensate for income losses during war time. The affected households replace their dead,
injured or physically and mentally disabled adult workers with children, in order to
compensate for the unexpected reduction in the household income. As a result, children
are removed from schools, reducing the stock of human capital, and resulting in loss of
long-term welfare for the family (Justino, 2011). Akresh and de Walque, Merrouche,
Shemyakina and Swee observed a reduction in educational attainment and enrolment
in countries undergoing civil war, as well as higher rates of child labour (Akresh and
de Walque, 2008) (Merrouche, 2007) (Swee, 2009) (Shemyakina, 2006). Furthermore,
household can redistribute their investments by gender. Due to destruction of indus-
tries and infrastructure during war periods, job opportunities for skilled labour generally
become scarce. Households may respond to this job scarcity by redistributing their re-
sources away from investments with lower returns. Shemyakina, and Chamarbagwala
and Mora´n have found that, during conflict periods, households may invest more in the
education of boys rather than girls, as boys may have a higher probability of finding
better paid jobs (Chamarbagwala and Mora´n, 2008) (Shemyakina, 2006).
Evans and Miguel find that young children in rural Kenya are more likely to drop out of
school after the parent’s death, especially the mother’s death. Rodriguez and Sanchez
examine the impact of war on child labour in Colombian municipalities between 1990
and 2003, and find significant rise in school drop-out and labour force participation rates
of children due to violence by armed groups. They show that increased mortality risks,
income shocks and decrease in quality of education due to violence are the main culprits
for reduction in educational investments and increases child labour at the household level.
Mooney and French estimate that about 27 million children are without education due
to emergencies in their regions. These out-of-school children are then used as labour to
contribute to household income. They find that the boys are used for field work while
the girls are used as household help (Evans and Miguel, 2004) (Rodriguez and Sanchez,
2009) (Mooney, 2005).
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Second, fear plays an important part in explaining the removal of children from schools
during violent events. Conflict-ridden countries often experience direct attacks on teach-
ers and students or the destruction of school buildings. These attacks lead to severe
psychological trauma for the affected; leaving children afraid to go to school, parents
afraid of sending them to school, and teachers are afraid to go to work. For example, in
Afghanistan, school children and staff have been directly targeted by the Taliban. More
than 100 children were killed in this way between 2006 and 2008, which has resulted in
the closure of around 670 schools in early 2009, depriving around 170,000 children of
access to education (IRIN, 2004). Fear of physical attacks and sexual violence is can act
as an obstacle for school enrolment abilities of affected children, especially girls. In such
environments, households may try to protect their children by keeping them at home.
Third, access to quality education is imperilled as educational infrastructure is often
targeted. Schools, teachers, students and staff in affected areas can be directly targeted
by terrorist attacks. The types of attack include the burning, shelling and bombing of
schools, the occupation of schools by armed forces, the murder, torture, abduction and
rape of teachers, students, education aid workers and school staff by armed groups or
military forces, and the forced recruitment of child soldiers (O’Malley, 2010). Schools
facing such threats often closed down to prevent untoward incidents and governments
may be reluctant to reopen schools because threats of attack may still be present. More-
over, it will also find it difficult to replace teachers in the attacked areas (Mulkeen, 2007).
Such incidents can have long-term impact on the quality and quantity of education in-
stitutions for those living in volatile areas.
In order to increase the number of members, militant groups recruit child-soldiers to
improve logistical support, spread fear and reduce resistance amongst local populations.
This can have considerable impact on their educational attainment, with consequences
on their level of human capital. In particular, participation in armed groups affects
negatively the long-term economic performance of child soldiers in terms of skills, pro-
ductivity and earnings because military activities are not good substitutes for the bene-
fits that individuals will acquire through education and work experience (Blattman and
Annan, 2010). These children are exposed to extreme violence and can develop severe
psychological issues such as post-traumatic stress syndrome, which in turn, affects their
educational outcomes (Justino, 2011).
According to the World Bank , there are about 300,000 child-soldiers involved violent
conflicts around the world, both boys and girls, under the age of 18 (Blattman and
Annan, 2010) (Bank, 2005). Most research focuses on male child soldiers, although
there is wide recognition of the involvement of girls in armed forces, as combatants
and as non-combatants (used as cooks, cleaners, nurses and so forth), and as victims
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of sexual slavery, forced ‘marriages’, rape and other forms of sexual violence (Annan
et al., 2009) (UNHCR/OSCE, 2002). In Pakistan’s case, after taking over in Swat, the
Taliban forced the locals to show their support by either paying a security fee or sending
a family member to join them. They also kidnapped local children and trained them as
suicide bombers. In early 2007, they began forcing schoolchildren to sign up for suicide
bombing missions in one part of Tank District and abducted 30 children for this purpose.
In Swat, as many as 1,500 children were abducted. While some of the boys were used
for labour in the camps, others were trained to fight in the field, become informants,
or undertake suicide-bombing missions. After the Swat military operation of 2009, the
Pakistan Army recovered and rehabilitated some of these children (Qazi, 2011).
Lastly, violent conflict can often result in displacement of the affected population, which
can last decades leaving whole generations without access to education. The education
resources in IDP camps are substandard , where the schools are overcrowded and limited
to primary education. Moreover, it is difficult to access schooling outside of camps. The
loss or confiscation of personal documents also makes enrolment difficult for displaced
populations (Aguilar and Retamal, 1998). School fees, the cost of school supplies and
travel costs may also pose constraints to the access of education by displaced children
(UNHCR/OSCE, 2002). Mooney and French find that in Colombia, only an estimated
15 perent of IDP children in 1999 received some form of education. Their school perfor-
mance was found to be significantly constrained by high rates of malnutrition, trauma
and cognitive disorders (Mooney and French, 2005).
2.4 Data Description
The main source of data for this study is the five rounds of the Pakistan Social and
Living Standards Measurement survey collected from 2004 to 2009. The PSLM is an
annual nationally-representative survey conducted since 2004-05. The survey is carried
out annually in all four provinces, although the tribal region is not present in all rounds.
The survey is organised at the level of the household and covers education, health,
social capital, fertility and marriage, employment, and economic status. This study
relies on data from only Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa province, which was the primary area
for Taliban attacks. The fieldwork for the fourth round of the PSLM was conducted
in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa between July, 2007 and June, 2008, immediately after the
first reported school attack in the GTD data in June, 2007. The fieldwork for the fifth
round was conducted in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa between August, 2008 and June, 2009
and in Swat between January, 2009 and June, 2009. This coincides roughly with the
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last attacks in Swat in March of 2009 following the military operation which began in
January of the same year and ended in July.
Table 2.1 shows variable definitions and their coding; the dependant variable for my
estimation is the enrolment status dummy. To measure the intensity of attacks, I have
created dummy variables for residence in high and low intensity districts. High intensity
districts (High Intensity) are defined by ten or more reported school attacks in the GTD
data (Dir, Swat, Bannu, Hangu, and rural Peshawar). Similarly, low intensity districts
(Low Intensty) are defined by 1−9 reported school attacks in the GTD data (Malakand,
Mardan, Charsadda, urban Peshawar, Noshehra, Swabi, and Mansehra). No attacks dis-
tricts (No attacks) are the remaining twelve districts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa with no
reported incidents in the GTD data (Chitral, Shangla, Buner, Kohat, Karak, D.I. Khan,
Tank, Abbotabad, Batagram, Kohistan, Haripur, and Lakki Marwat). The remaining
variables are the standard determinants of school enrolment in developing countries.
Parental income (Father logincome and Mother logincome) and education (Father edu
and Mother edu) are included as controls for family background and intergenerational
transmission of human capital where family attitudes encourage schooling as an educated
parent acts as a role model for the children. Following Currie and Moretti, I expect that
school enrolment will be positively related to both parental education and household in-
come (Currie and Moretti, 2002). The variable indicating the labour force participation
of a child (Child work) is included to control for alternative possible uses of children’s
time. I expect a negative coefficient on child work as children in employment will have
fewer hours available for other activities, including schooling. Similarly, I expect the
variable indicating birth order (First born) to have a negative effect of enrolment rates.
Older children are often used as helping hands in contributing to household income as
well as care-taking activities for the elderly and young children in the household leaving
fewer hours available for other activities, including schooling.
The descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest are presented in Table 2.2.
The top panel shows the sample statistics for the years 2004 to 2006 (before attacks)
while the bottom panel shows the sample for the years 2007 to 2009 (during and after
attacks). The first reported attacks were from June, 2007 while the survey for the year
2007-08 was conducted from July, 2007 to June 2008. This would cover the time period
when the school attacks were ongoing. The fieldwork for the last round of the survey
was carried out in KPK till 2009, which was just after the spring army offensive in Swat
and the district had been cleared from the Taliban. This allows me to examine the short
term impact of exposure to terrorist activities in the worst affected districts.
The data for terrorist incidents comes from South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and
Chapter 2. The Taliban and Girls’ Schooling in Northwest Pakistan 17
Global Terrorism Database (GTB), which have detailed information on terrorist inci-
dents between 1970 and 2011. This data is disaggregated at district level by intensity
of attacks on educational institutions. Figure 2.2 shows a sudden increase in attacks
on schools after 2006 and a decline after 2010. It can be seen that in 2007 and 2008
the majority of the attacks occurred in Swat district. From 2009 onwards, there is a
sharp decrease in the number of school attacks in Swat, coinciding with the Operation
Rah-e-Rast in 2009 where the military regained control of the area. Bombing incidents
beyond 2009 were predominantly carried out in Peshawar district 10 11.
Figure 2.3 shows the division of districts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa by intensity level of
violence. Table 2.3 shows the distribution in education level for the baseline years of
2004-2006 by gender, region, and intensity levels for individuals in the whole of Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa province in top panel and in Swat and rural Peshawar in the bottom
panel. Gender differences are apparent, with female education lagging behind male
education throughout the entire country but especially in high intensity districts. The
urban-rural difference in years of schooling is in the range of 1 to 1.3 years of school for
boys and 1.4 to 1.8 years for girls. In the lower panels it can be seen that Swat had the
highest number of years of education completed for girls under the age of 18, while rural
Peshawar had among the lowest years of schooling in the data for KPK in the affected
districts.
Furthermore, in the areas with no attacks, mean years in education for girls 5.4 years,
which is not too different than the low (5.6) and high intensity areas (4.8), implying that
there was not significant level of discrepancy in education level between the attacked
treatment areas and the control areas with no attacks and the baseline level of education
is not skewed. The terrorist attacked those districts which were easily accessible to them,
e.g. Peshawar is on the border with FATA, which is the hideout for TTP (Figure 2.3).
Nearer to the border with Punjab, the number of attacks die down. The twelve no
attacked districts do not share a border with FATA (accept Tank and Dera Ismael
Khan, which experienced other forms of terrorist attacks).
Table 2.4 shows the enrolment rates in the higher intensity, low intensity, and no attack
districts prior and subsequent to the Taliban campaign. It can be seen that enrolment
improved in the later years for all cohorts in all three types of districts, reflecting a
general tendency in developing countries for schooling outcomes to improve over time
(Chamarbagwala and Mora´n, 2008). Table 2.4 also implies that the cohort of children
who were affected by the terrorist attacks did not attain less schooling on average than
10Global Terrorism Database
11In the summer 2010, Pakistan experienced a massive flood which covered 1/5th of the country. Many
residents from the sample districts had to migrate/evacuate from their towns, hence causing attrition in
the treatment sample.
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previous cohorts. In the full sample of province, the raw difference-in-difference shows a
0.4 percent gender differential in enrolment rates, where girls are on average have lower
school enrolment than boys, both before and after the treatment period. However, in
the high intensity districts, the enrolment gender differential decreased by 1.8 percent.
These results provide preliminary evidence that the enrolment rates of girls in affected
districts may not have been adversely affected by terrorist violence.
Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show enrolment nationally and in KPK for the survey
years 2004 to 2009. Figure 2.4 shows the enrolment rates for the entire country. It is
evident that, nationally, school enrolment increased during the five survey years at a
similar rate for boys and girls. It is also evident that boys’ enrolment rate was about
10 percent higher than that of girls. In figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7, the sample is restricted
by terrorism intensity levels. Figure 2.6, shows that in the low intensity districts there
was a drop in enrolment rates for girls in the first year of school attacks (2007-08) and
recovery in the following year. Figure 2.5, shows that the opposite applied for high
intensity districts. Figure 2.7,restricts the sample to districts which had no reported
school attacks. Within these districts, there was little movement in enrolment rates over
time. These figures provide preliminary evidence that girls’ enrolment may have been
effected by the terrorist attacks on schools.
2.5 Empirical Estimation and Results
The identification strategy used in this paper exploits the variation in intensity of ter-
rorist attacks on schools across districts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa during 2007-2009.
The enrolment level in districts which experienced no attacks act as a control group for
what enrolment would’ve looked like in the absence of terrorist attacks. To identify an
individual’s exposure to violence during school years, their enrolment is matched with
their district of residence. The baseline specification is presented below:
Ei = (Female)µ+ (Treated years)ξ + (Intensity)τ + (Intensity ∗ Treatedyears)γ +
(Intensity ∗ Female)η + (Female ∗ Treated years)θ + (Highintensity ∗
Treated years ∗ Female)δ + β(Xi)
where the dependant variable is Ei which measures the enrolment status of individual i
and female is the gender of the individual i. Intensity is a vector of dummies (low, high)
for attack intensity level in district of residence. Districts that didn’t experience any
terrorist activities act as the omitted group. The intensity level dummies are further
restricted by two exposure survey years, 2007-08 and 2008-09, as the pattern of attacks
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was very different in these two years as can be seen in figure 2.2. As discussed in figure
2.2, the attacks in Swat districts decreased in 2009 while continued in Peshawar. This
exogenous shock allows for a difference-in-difference comparison of the school attacks for
a short period in 2009. If there is an impact on enrolment rates for girls, I expect to find
a decrease in the subsample of Swat. Treated years is a dummy variable for whether
the individual was surveyed in 2007-08 or 2008-09. Observations from 2004-06 are used
as the control group. The year dummies (2007-08 and 2008-09) and district intensity
dummies (High Intensity and Low intensity) control for the effects of treatment years
and treatment districts that are constant across all individuals in the same cohort. The
interaction of intensity level and survey year gives the difference-in-difference estimates
on the effects of intensity level in the year of enrolment. The triple interaction of
female with treatment years and district intensity level is the variable of interest in the
regressions, measuring the gender-specific impact of residing in regions that experienced
terrorism after 2007 after controlling for cohort, gender and conflict effects individually
and their interactions. β(Xi) includes standard individual level characteristics of region,
household size, parental education and income, birth order, and marital status. All
regressions are estimated by probit with robust standard errors.
Results:
Table 2.5 presents the estimates of the probit regressions where column 1 displays the
results for the full sample of those aged 18 or under in all of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa
province. Column 2 to 4 divides the cohort by age groups 3 to 9, 10 to 14 and 15 to
18; this is the breakdown for primary, secondary, and higher secondary schooling levels
(grade 1-4, 5-9, and 10-12). The coefficients on the control variables of individual and
household characteristics have the expected signs. Girls are about 27 percent less likely
to be enrolled for all age groups, confirming the gender gap in enrolment illustrated in
figures 4-8. Urban areas have higher enrolment rates for all age cohorts. The variables
for age and age-squared have positive and negative signs respectively, suggesting that
the enrolment curve follows an inverted U-shape as age increases. Household size has
a negative effect on the enrolment of those aged 10-18, suggesting that older children
are often used as alternative caregiver for younger siblings in the household. Being
married reduces the likelihood of being enrolled by 30 percent for the subsample of
pupils aged 15-1812. Children who are employed are 40 to 50 percent less likely to be
going to school. One additional year of parental education increases the probability that
the child is enrolled by are 2-3 percent. Also, household monthly earnings can have
an income effect; if education is considered normal good, richer families will buy more
schooling for their children.
12An interaction term of gender and marital status shows that this effect is driven by girls of mar-
riageable age. The regressions coefficients do not change significantly.
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The full sample regression in column 1 shows a reduction of 3.37 percent in the probabil-
ity of being currently enrolled in the survey year 2007-08. When the sample is restricted
by intensity level, the estimated likelihood of girls being enrolled declines by 10.3 per-
cent in 2007-08 in the low intensity districts. For the high intensity districts, there is no
significant decline for girls in 2007-08. Moreover, the estimated enrolment rates in the
high intensity districts increase by roughly 3 percent in the year 2008-09. In other words
the negative effect from the previous year disappears. In columns 2-4, the regression is
rerun by age groups of 6-9 years, 10-14 years, and 15-18 years. For the age group 10-14,
girls are 23 percent less likely to be enrolled in the year 2007-2008 for low intensity
districts while for the remaining two groups, there are no significant effects. There is no
significant effect of the youngest group of primary-school going girls. This is consistent
with the nature of the Taliban threats, which were primarily aimed at girls aged 10 or
above. This result is consistent with existing literature on schooling and conflict which
finds that only secondary schooling bears the brunt of violence (Justino, 2011). In the
year 2008-09, the estimated enrolment for girls aged 3-9 increases by about 4 percent
in the high intensity districts and 7 percent in the low intensity districts. There are
no significant effects on the enrolment of girls aged 10-14 or 15 and older. The likely
explanation for no effect on girls older than 15 years is that enrolment rates were al-
ready quite low for older girls as due to the practice of purdah in the Pushtoon culture
where older girls are forced to drop out of schools by families who expect to marry them
off. These results points towards only a short-lived impact of school attacks on districts
which experienced violence. In the existing literature discussed in section 3, the effect
of conflict on female education shows a gender gap of 12-17 percent for secondary edu-
cation. Comparing Pakistan with other countries under conflict, it is observed that the
magnitude of the effect terrorism is short-lived and relatively small.
Case studies for Swat and Peshawar districts: Among the high intensity districts, Swat
and Peshawar were the focal points of terrorist attacks on schools where these two
districts experienced the highest frequency in attacks on girls’ schools (GTD data).
These two districts are the most populous of attacked districts and, according to Census
reports, had the highest enrolment rates in the province and thus it is worth investigating
whether the nature of the disruption caused by the terrorist attacks was the same in
both districts. In the Swat District, 172 schools were reported destroyed or damaged
between 2007 and March 2009 as the Taliban fought and eventually took control of the
area. In spring 2009, Pakistan army started a military operation to drive out insurgents
and regained control of the area (O’Malley, 2010). In the Peshawar district, girls’ schools
were attacked only in the rural areas. Unlike Swat, Peshawar experienced an increase
in total number of schools bombed in 2009. The PSLM data for 2008-09 was collected
in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa during August, 2008 and June, 2009. The timing of the
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data collection makes it possible to determine the effects of the end of the attacks by
comparing enrolment in Swat and Peshawar in 2008-09. If girls were not deterred from
schools, I’d expect to see them return to schools as soon as Swat district was cleared from
insurgents in 2009. However, because the attacks continued in Peshawar throughout the
timeframe of the PSLM data, I would expect that any effects would continue through
2009.
To identify the effects of exposure to violence during school years for girls in Swat and
Peshawar districts, I have modified the baseline econometric specification as follows:
E(Swat)i = (Female)γ + (Treated Y ears)η + (Female ∗ Treated years)θ + β(Xi)
(Peshawar)i = (Female)γ + (Treated Y ears)η + (Female ∗ Treated years)θ + β(Xi)
where the dependant variables measure the enrolment status of individual i in the sub-
samples of Swat and Peshawar districts . The difference-in-difference coefficient, which
is the interaction of female and treatment years, measures the gender-specific impact
of the terrorist attacks in Swat and Peshawar in the years after 2007. β(Xi) includes
standard individual level characteristics of region, household size, parental education
and income, birth order, and marital status. The regressions are estimated by probit
with robust standard errors.
Table 2.6 gives the estimates for the regressions for the subsample of Swat and rural
Peshawar. Due to the reduction in sample size, the results are less statistically significant
than in the full sample regressions13. The results for the Swat are consistent with the
pooled sample of intensity level by districts. In the first year of the attacks, the enrolment
rates for girls goes down by 7.85 percent but the affect disappears in the second year,
implying that the attacks only had a short term impact. This short-lived impact in Swat
coincides with the military action which cleared the insurgents from the area. Schools
opened soon after the army took back control of the district, and the results suggest that
girls returned to their studies as soon as was possible. In the subsample of Peshawar
suburbs, I do not find any significant coefficients for the difference-in-difference variables.
It is worth noting that the attacks in Peshawar districts continued beyond survey year
2008-09, therefore new rounds of the data would shed further light on the effectiveness
of the attacks.
Madrassa enrolment: The threatening night letters sent out to schools urged pupils to
join madrassas (unregistered schools that teach religious curriculum rather than ministry
13The samples of Swat and Peshawar include individuals aged 18 or less. Unlike the full sample
regressions, I was not able to restrict the sample by age group as the number of observations was too
small to run a regression in Stata.
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of education-approved curriculum) in place of regular schools. If the Taliban’s threats
were successful in intimidating the public into joining madrassas, I expect to see a jump
in madrassas enrolment in the high-intensity districts. Previous research on madrassa
enrolment show that religious school are an unpopular schooling choice as enrolment has
always been less than one percent, only prevalent in low-income areas without public or
private schooling options. Due to an ongoing dramatic growth of private schools, the
number of areas without public or private schooling options has reduced considerably. In
1983 there were approximately 3,300 private primary and secondary schools in the four
provinces (Jimenez and Tan, 1987) . In 2000 there were 32,000 private schools, a nearly
ten-fold increase (Khwaja et al., 2006). The total enrolment in religious schools is only
about one percent of the total sample of enrolled students. For the average Pakistani
child of school going age, the most popular alternative to government schooling is a
private school, not a madrassa (Khwaja et al., 2006).
In order to test for the effects of terrorism on madrassas enrolment in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa,
I use the school type variable in the PSLM and code a dummy for madrassa enrolment
conditional on being enrolled in school. That is, students who are currently in enrol-
ment and have reported ‘religious school’ as school type are coded as 1, the rest enrolled
in school types other than religious schools are coded as 0. To identify the effect of
school bombing on conditional enrolment rates in religious schools, I run the following
regressions:
E(Religious School)i =
(Female)µ+ (Treated years)ξ + (Intensity)τ + (Intensity level ∗ Treatedyears)γ +
(Intensity intensity ∗ Female)η + (Female ∗ Treated years)θ + (High intensity ∗
Treated years ∗ Female)δ + β(Xi)
E(Religious School for boys)i =
(Intensity level)γ + (Treated years)θ + (High intensity ∗ Treated years)δ + β(Xi)
E(Religious School for girls)i =
(Intensity level)γ + (Treated years)θ + (High intensity ∗ Treated years)δ + β(Xi)
where the dependant variable is E(Religious School)i which measures the enrolment
status of individual i in a madrassa (religious school). E(Religious School for boys)i
and E(Religious School for girls)i are the dependant variables for the sample restricted
by gender. The specification in the full sample of madrassa enrolment regression is
the same as the full sample regression of regular school enrolment. The difference-in-
difference-in-difference coefficient measures the impact of being female on conditional
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madrassa enrolment in an affected district during affected years. The interaction of
female with treatment years and district intensity level measures the gender-specific
impact of residing in regions that experienced high terrorism after 2007 on the enrolment
in madrassas. The regression has also been run with the sample restricted by gender.
The control variables used are the same as the full sample regressions. The difference-in-
difference coefficient, which is the interaction term of intensity level and treated years,
measures the impact on madrassa enrolment in an affected district during affected years
for boys and girls separately.
Table 2.7 shows the regressions for the sample of boys and girls under the age of 19
years14. I find significantly negative results for madrassas enrolment in all samples for
the year 2007-08 and 2008-09. The difference-in-difference terms of gender and year, year
and intensity level, and gender and intensity level are all negative and highly significant
with magnitude varying of 1 percent or less. The interaction of female in high intensity
areas shows that girls are 1 percent less likely to be enrolled than boys. The sample
was further restricted by age group but significance and precision is lost due to the low
number of observations. Thus, children were less likely to be enrolled in religious schools
after 2007. Column 1 shows the estimate for the full sample of children of school going
age of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa, where the difference-in-difference-in-difference estimate
shows that in high intensity districts, girls are 2.3 percentage points more likely to be
enrolled in madrassas than boys, implying that both boys and girls are less likely to be
enrolled in madrassas but the difference is smaller for girls. Even though the enrolment
in madrassas is decreasing in the province, the rate of decrease is smaller for girls than
boys. This result is congruous with the estimates in columns 2 and 3 which show the
estimates for the subsamples of boys and girls, respectively, of school going age in Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa province. In the high intensity districts, the likelihood of being enrolled
in religious schools declined by between 1.4 and 0.91 percent for boys and between 1.1
and 0.87 percent for girls. This is in line with finding of Asim Khwaja that in settlements
where regular schooling options exist, less than two percent of enrolled students are in
madrassas with no evidence of significant increases in recent years. It can be concluded
that the Taliban’s’ demands for joining religious schools were widely ignored by the
public in the affected districts and madrassas are not an important part of enrolment
decisions of Pakistani pupils (Khwaja et al., 2006).
14Household controls can be made available on request
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2.6 Conclusion
This study takes a step towards understanding the impact of terrorist activities in north-
western Pakistan since 2006. The increased insurgency in the north-western regions of
Pakistan threatened the educational attainment of young girls and boys, with the Taliban
specifically targeting the education of girls. I examine the enrolment rates of girls by
using five consecutive rounds of the Pakistan Standards of Living Measurement survey.
The empirical strategy uses a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, comparing
the differences in enrolment across three dimensions, gender, district (separated by in-
tensity of attacks), and years. I first estimate the gender differential for total school
enrolment in the affected districts and then estimate the impact on enrolment in reli-
gious schools. The results suggest that the impact of these terrorist attacks was relatively
modest and short-lived. Girls aged 10-14 in the districts of North-western Pakistan that
experienced terrorist incidents between 2007 and 2009 had 10.3 percent lower enrolment
rates in the first year of attacks. In the following year, when the Pakistani military
retook control over some of the affected areas, this effect fades away, suggesting that
students returned to schools as soon control was regained in the most-affected areas.
Moreover, there is no evidence of dramatic increases in religious school enrolment rates.
Enrolment in religious schools has not seen any increases beyond the 2 percent enrolment
rate, pointing at failed intimidation attempts of the terrorists.
The results of this paper are largely at odds with what has been reported in the media.
Countless media reports in the last decade claim that increased presence of terrorists is
driving girls out of schools and boys into madrassas15 16 17. The results presented here
speak differently than what is popularly believed, suggesting the effects of the Taliban’s
terrorism campaign were relatively modest. There is no evidence for substantial drop in
the school enrolment rates in the worst affected districts or an increase in the enrolment
rates of religious schools. There is a relatively small effect estimated for girls aged 10-
14 during 2007-08, the years of highest-intensity terrorist attacks, followed by a rapid
return to normality after the Pakistani counterinsurgency measures in 2008. Therefore,
the results presented in this paper show that the claims presented by the media are
highly exaggerated and blown out of proportion. Contrary to popular perception driven
by media reports of Taliban violence against girls attending school, the impact of these
terrorist attacks was only short-lived.
15IRIN News, “Pakistan: Swat Militants Driving Girls Out of School.” January 20, 2009.
16IRIN News, ”Child soldiers in Swat Valley” May 26, 2008
17 Declan Walsh, ”Taliban reaches beyond Swat Valley in Pakistan.” April 25, 2009
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Figure 2.3: Intensity level by districts of KPK.
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Table 2.3: Educational attainment in pre-attack years 2004-2006, by region, intensity
level, and gender for sample of individuals aged 18 or younger.
BOYS GIRLS
Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. n
KPK Province
Urban 7.17 4.34 12707 6.4 4.22 8099
Rural 5.87 4.03 28127 4.66 3.82 13093
Total 6.27 4.17 40834 5.33 4.07 21192
High Intensity
Urban 7.08 4.23 2802 5.85 4.03 1544
Rural 5.64 4.01 9056 4.42 3.76 3837
Total 5.98 4.11 11858 4.83 3.9 5381
Low Intensity
Urban 7 4.53 5047 6.31 4.38 3215
Rural 6.02 4.03 4696 4.69 3.71 2501
Total 6.53 4.33 9743 5.6 4.18 5716
No attack
Urban 7.39 4.17 4858 6.73 4.11 3340
Rural 5.96 4.03 14375 4.79 3.89 6755
Total 6.32 4.11 19233 5.43 4.07 10095
Swat
6.36 4.06 2318 4.96 3.81 1116
Peshawar
5.52 3.95 1325 3.94 3.65 435
Table 2.4: Enrolment status by gender in KPK from 2004-2009
Girls Boys Diff
KPK Province
After 0.3803 0.5768 -0.1965
Before 0.3421 0.5342 -0.1921
Diff -0.03814 -0.0425 -0.0044
High Intensity
After 0.3692 0.5756 -0.2064
Before 0.3114 0.5366 -0.2252
Diff 0.0579 0.0390 0.0188
Low Intensity
After 0.4253 0.5949 -0.1695
Before 0.3962 0.5477 -0.1515
Diff 0.0292 0.0472 -0.0180
No attack
After 0.3676 0.5696 -0.2020
Before 0.3377 0.5264 -0.1886
Diff 0.0299 0.0432 -0.0133
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Table 2.5: Probit regressions on enrolment status in KPK, 2004-2009 - Marginal
effects
Currently Enrolled Full sample Age 3-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-18
Female -0.231*** -0.145*** -0.317*** -0.286***
(0.00645) (0.0104) (0.00997) (0.0133)
Age 0.280*** 0.709*** 0.0751** 0.482***
(0.00196) (0.0123) (0.0358) (0.114)
Age2 -0.0127*** -0.0426*** -0.00476*** -0.0173***
(9.28e-05) (0.000946) (0.00149) (0.00345)
Hh size -0.000806** -0.00177*** -0.00698*** -0.00120
(0.000355) (0.000523) (0.000563) (0.000792)
Married -0.252*** -0.0806 -0.294***
(0.0102) (0.0579) (0.0114)
First born 0.00274 -0.00195 -0.00331 0.00265
(0.00488) (0.00934) (0.00766) (0.00834)
Urban 0.0854*** 0.0813*** 0.0980*** 0.0845***
(0.00409) (0.00655) (0.00607) (0.00852)
Father years education 0.0201*** 0.0174*** 0.0235*** 0.0269***
(0.000363) (0.000575) (0.000652) (0.000774)
Mother years education 0.0195*** 0.0211*** 0.0212*** 0.0327***
(0.000709) (0.00112) (0.00176) (0.00174)
Father log income -0.00413*** -0.00517*** -0.00371*** -0.00378***
(0.000256) (0.000404) (0.000414) (0.000555)
Mother log income 0.00335*** 0.00187* 0.00488*** 0.00390***
(0.000649) (0.00103) (0.00108) (0.00146)
Year 2007-08 -0.0306** -0.00484 -0.0557** 0.0138
(0.0120) (0.0195) (0.0228) (0.0274)
Year 2008-09 0.0671*** 0.0753*** 0.0978*** 0.0753***
(0.00652) (0.0103) (0.0117) (0.0141)
High intensity 0.0157** 0.00871 0.0207* 0.0228
(0.00716) (0.0112) (0.0121) (0.0152)
Low intensity -0.00506 0.0357*** -0.0294** -0.0401**
(0.00808) (0.0132) (0.0144) (0.0165)
Year 2007-08*High 0.0700*** 0.0698** 0.109*** 0.0223
(0.0176) (0.0274) (0.0247) (0.0379)
Year 2007-08*Low 0.0611*** 0.0277 0.118*** 0.0344
(0.0215) (0.0340) (0.0300) (0.0456)
Year 2008-09*High -0.0147 -0.0189 -0.00194 -0.0159
(0.0104) (0.0166) (0.0197) (0.0224)
Year 2008-09*Low -0.0154 -0.0389** -0.0159 -0.00301
(0.0117) (0.0187) (0.0227) -0.0246
Female*High -0.0463*** -0.0337** -0.0484*** -0.0710***
(0.0104) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0222)
Female*Low 0.0357*** 0.000669 0.0585*** 0.0680***
(0.0120) (0.0187) (0.0168) (0.0252)
Year 2007-08*Female 0.0333* 0.00680 0.0641*** 0.0215
(0.0181) (0.0287) (0.0247) (0.0393)
Year 2008-09*Female -0.0419*** -0.0443*** -0.0660*** -0.0411**
(0.00951) (0.0151) (0.0172) (0.0207)
Year 2007-08*Female*High 0.0321 0.0405 -0.0137 0.0546
(0.0255) (0.0405) (0.0432) (0.0562)
Year 2007-08*Female*Low -0.0992*** -0.0161 -0.217*** -0.110*
(0.0274) (0.0485) (0.0628) (0.0602)
Year 2008-09*Female*Low 0.0226 0.0701** -0.00189 0.0109
(0.0176) (0.0284) (0.0290) (0.0369)
Year 2008-09*Female*High 0.0279* 0.0397 0.0196 0.00975
(0.0160) (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0354)
Observations 127,768 52,535 33,282 24,614
Percent Enrolled 45.95 47.89 68.29 42.9
Percent Enrolled and Female 35.7 41.14 51.26 27.65
Notes: Robust s.e. in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Percent enrolled is the enrolment rate for full sample. Percent enrolled &
female is the enrolment rate for the subsample of girls
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Table 2.6: Probit regressions on current enrolment in Swat and Peshawar - Marginal
effects
Currently Enrolled Swat District Peshawar Rural Areas
Female -0.231*** -0.330***
(0.018) (0.02)
Age 0.294*** 0.254***
(0.009) (0.009)
Age2 -0.0131*** -0.0122***
(0.001) (0.001)
Hh size -0.000243 0.00555***
(0.001) (0.002)
Married -0.262*** -0.0972
(0.037) (0.066)
First born -0.00971 0.0715***
(0.0233) (0.0253)
Urban 0.0903***
(0.016)
Father education 0.0168*** 0.0222***
(0.0016) (0.002)
Mother education 0.0123*** 0.0232***
(0.003) (0.006)
Father log income -0.00230* -8.54e-05
(0.001) (0.001)
Mother log income -0.000453 0.00189
(0.0036) (0.004)
Year 2007-08 0.123*** 0.0402
(0.029) (0.029)
Year 2008-09 -0.0190 0.0330
(0.024) (0.023)
Year 2007-08*Female -0.078** 0.0561
(0.040) (0.044)
Year 2008-09*Female -0.0433 -0.0517
(0.034) (0.034)
Observations 6,048 4,676
Percent Enrolled 45.05 39.68
Percent Enrolled and Female 35.22 25.22
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Percent enrolled is the enrolment rate for full sample.
Percent enrolled and female is the enrolment rate for the subsample of girls.
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Table 2.7: Probit regressions on current enrolment in madrassas in KPK - Marginal
effects
Religious school enrolment Full Sample Girls Boys
Female 0.00986***
(0.002)
Year 2007-08 0.0119*** -0.00278 0.0117***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Year 2008-09 0.00210 -0.00494** 0.00208
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Year 2007-08*High -0.0142*** -0.0109*** -0.0137***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Year 2007-08*Low -0.00971*** 0.00658 -0.00945***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Year 2008-09*High -0.00933*** -0.00873*** -0.00909***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Year 2008-09*Low -0.00442** -0.00121 -0.00433**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Female*High Intensity -0.00975***
(0.001)
Female*Low Intensity -0.00270
(0.002)
Year 2007-08*Female -0.0100***
(0.002)
Year 2008-09*Female -0.00827***
(0.002)
Year 2007-08*Female*High 0.0809*
(0.0472)
Year 2007-08*Female*Low 0.0482*
(0.0293)
Year 2008-09*Female*Low 0.00808
(0.00662)
Year 2008-09*Female*High 0.0236**
(0.0113)
Observations 59,079 21,790 37,197
percent Enrolled 1.76 1.87 1.69
Percent Enrolled and Female 1.87
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Percent enrolled is the enrolment rate for full sample.
Percent enrolled and female is the enrolment rate for the subsample of girls.
Chapter 3
The Impact of Terrorist Activities
on Female Employment -
Evidence from North-western
Pakistan
3.1 Introduction
This study contributes to the growing literature on effects of terrorism on labour market
outcomes of individuals by focusing on the experience of Pakistan since 2007 (Shemyak-
ina, 2010) (Blattman and Annan, 2010) (Menon and Rodgers, 2010) (Kecmanovic, 2013)
(Kondylis, 2008) (Fernandez and Pena, 2011). The microeconomic impact of terrorism
on civilian populations can be substantial and persistent. Not only do people living
in troubled areas suffer injuries and have their property destroyed, they may also be
displaced from their towns, lose their means of livelihood, or be unable to take part in
the labour market or education. All of these effects may result in a permanent decline
in their stock of human capital and earnings. Furthermore, since war costs tend to
be disproportionately borne by the underprivileged and most vulnerable populations,
conflict may intensify poverty and inequality (Chamarbagwala and Mora´n, 2008). Un-
derstanding the short-term and longer-term economic consequences of terrorism is thus
important for implementing post-conflict reconstruction/rehabilitation efficiently and
helping identify those populations that reconstruction policy should target.
Although men are typically more affected by direct conflict-related death, in Pakistan’s
case women face more challenges, as the terrorists have specifically targeted women.
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Specifically, the Taliban in the northern areas of Pakistan have aimed at barring women
from taking part in public sphere by sending threatening letters to the public, blowing
up public property, and attacking women who defied any ban. Female employment
in Pakistan had increased considerably between 1990 and 2006 from 15 percent to 20
percent, although participation rate has always been below that of males1. The targeting
of women by the Taliban was therefore seen as a threat to the improvement in women’s
future socio-economic status.
This paper estimates the impact of terrorist activities of the Taliban on the labour market
outcomes of Pakistani women using five consecutive rounds of the Pakistan Social and
Living Standards survey (PSLM) from the years 2004 to 2009. This data is merged
with data on terrorist attacks compiled from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
The variation in intensity of violence, measured in number of terrorist attacks in each
district of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa over time, is used to identify the effect of terrorism on
the employment rates of women. The first estimation looks at the effects of attacks on
the employment rates of all women and men. As a robustness check, I then estimate this
separately for men and women in the age groups of 18 and younger and 19 and older. A
second robustness check separately estimates the effects of these attacks on employment
rates by marital status. The Taliban threatened women and tried to exclude them from
the public sphere. If these threats were perceived to be credible, I would expect to see
a drop in overall female employment rates relative to male employment rates after the
bombings. The empirical analysis suggests that there is a negative impact on women’s
overall employment rates only the first year of the attacks, i.e. 2007-08. By 2009, this
effect seems to disappear, pointing to a short-lived fear affect created by the terrorism.
This is in line with the previous chapter on effects of terrorist attacks on educational
attainment, which measured a relatively short lived impact on employment rates to girls
in the affected districts.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 looks at the background of the Taliban.
Section 3.3 review existing literature. Section 3.4 describes the data while the empirical
strategy and results of the estimation are presented in section 3.5 and 3.6. Section 3.7
concludes the paper.
3.2 Background: Who are the Taliban?
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a terrorist organisation operating in Pakistan that
was formed in the days of NATO operations in Afghanistan. After the American in-
tervention in Afghanistan, a section of radicals started a movement inside Pakistan to
1ILO, 2014
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support the Afghani Taliban. TTP members consist of locals from the tribal areas and
adjacent districts. There are also reports of foreigners within the TTP. The South Asia
Terrorism Portal estimates place the total number of operatives between 30,000 and
35,000. Headquartered in the South Waziristan Agency of FATA, TTP has spread its
networks into all of Pakistan’s four provinces, establishing various chapters and groups
led by local commanders with common organisational goals. The TTP has also made
its presence felt in neighbouring Afghanistan in recent times. In recent years, other
banned terrorist outfits have joined forces with the TTP (Lashkar-e-Tayiba, Jaish-e-
Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan). The TTP has been
banned by Pakistan, US, Canada, Britain, and by the UN Security Council (SAT, 2014).
One of the main aims of the Taliban is to impose strict Sharia law, the main tenets
of which include restricting the participation of women in public life. As discussed in
chapter 2, the Taliban aimed to bar girls from attending schools by blowing up school
buildings. They also imposed a strict dress-code for women who leave the house (burqa2).
Incidents of public flogging3, targeting health workers4 and aid workers5, killings of
female entertainers6, and large-scale intimidation of the population were reported in
the media. The Taliban demanded unislamic businesses to close (Video stores, cable
service providers, and internet cafes), they also warned women to start wearing hijab
or “have their faces maimed with acid”. They also issued threats to anyone working
for a foreign organisation and attacked Nato supplier trucks, and journalists, threatened
non-Muslims residents , voters, and journalists in Swat and adjacent areas7.
3.3 Literature Review
Pakistani/South Asian women and LFP
The underlying theoretical approach of this paper is the basic model of labour supply.
Becker developed a theoretical model of time allocation within the household, following
the traditional theory of utility maximization where it is assumed that the households
are producers as well as consumers. An increase in wage rate is likely to induce a
decline in the amount of time used on consumption activities and an increase in market
production resulting from relative increase in the value of time. Almost similar argument
is presented by Samuelson (Becker, 1965) (Samuelson, 1956). The classical labour supply
model postulates that that labour supply decisions are made to maximize utility subject
2Taliban issue burqa warning – Daily Times, 2008
3Pakistan to probe girl’s flogging” – BBC News, 2009
4Taliban trap civilians in Pakistani war zone – Gulf News, 2009
5 U.S. Aid worker slain in Pakistan – NY Times, 2008
6In Pakistan, Radio Amplifies Terror of Taliban – NY Times, 2009
7Taliban threaten Kalash tribe, Ismailis in Chitral – Dawn News, 2009
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to budget constraints. This utility depends on amount of market goods and leisure time
where individual faces two types of constraints: first, the price of good and price of
leisure i.e. wages per hour. The individual must forgo their wage when they devote
an hour to leisure rather than work. Second, the total amount of time available to the
individual is limited and fixed, which may be allocated between leisure and work. The
effect of a change in the wage rate on leisure depends on the relative magnitudes of the
income effect and the substitution effect. A change in the price of labour (wages) can
either cause an income effect or a substitution effect. A wage increase leads to more
income and greater utility, which has an income effect on leisure, where the individual
can afford to consume more leisure time. However, this wage increase also makes leisure
more expensive as each hour of work is more lucrative, leading to a negative substitution
effect on consumption of leisure and a positive substitution effect on labour supply. Wage
increases make work more attractive, and the individual consumes less leisure time and
more work hours, thus substituting consumption goods for leisure (Killingsworth, 1983).
In a developing country setting, the Becker model might not hold true. An alternative
labour supply model suggested by Gronaue, which links spouses’ wage with home pro-
duction and leisure, would be more appropriate in this setting. The model predicts that
an increase in the wage rate of the employed decreases the time allocated for work of the
spouse. The income effect is negative in the case of the wife while it is positive in the
case of the husband’s. Thus, on the whole, one would expect the wage rate of husband
and work of the wife to be negatively correlated and leisure to be positively correlated
(Gronaue, 1977).
Gender inequalities in Pakistan
Pakistan suffers from severe gender inequalities, not only with respect to human devel-
opment and service access, but with respect to basic rights, participation in economic
activity and in development of decision-making. These not only translate into greater
disadvantage for poor women than for men, but also hinder a household’s ability to
earn income and pull themselves out of poverty. Customary practices, denial of prop-
erty and inheritance rights, absence of available and accessible protection and justice to
women, their lack of information about legal, economic or political rights, and mobility
collectively deny opportunities to women (Mumtaz, 2007).
Customary practices: Family honour and societal values in some conservative parts of
South Asia impose strict purdah restricting women to the home, and thus reducing
their ability to work outside the house (Chen, 1995). According to Hanna Papanek,
even the small numbers of women who work in urban areas face a lot of segregation
in the workplace and crowding into what are seen as female occupations. Most women
who are working full-time are either in the field of medicine or teaching as these career
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choices are deemed respectable for women. Moreover, there is segregation in education as
parents prefer to send their daughters to all-girls schools and colleges. These constraints
often push women into self-employment and unpaid work, or entirely out of the labour
market (Papanek, 1973).
Majority of Pakistani women are confined to domestic space or activities related to
the fulfilment of family’s needs. While permitted to undertake activities outside the
household like going distances to fetch water, fuel or fodder, they are not expected to
take part in any other public activity. Older women may exceptionally enter the market
if widowed or without any male bread-earner in the household.
Denial of property rights and Land ownership of women: Pakistani women’s lack of
information about legal, economic or political rights, absence of protection and jus-
tice to women, and restricted mobility collectively deny women opportunities of owning
and accessing assets and resources. They have little access or control over productive
resources, even in situations where they may have the legal right to own and inherit prop-
erty. These unequal rights can affect a woman’s power to influence resource allocation
and investment decisions at all levels.
Shirkat Gah’s field based study found that according to customary practice, gener-
ally in all the four provinces of Pakistan, women do not inherit property. In Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa province, the daughters do not inherit land except in some areas closer
to Punjab. Also, their share can be forfeited in favour of male family members. Fur-
thermore, households on the lower end of the income distribution rarely own land and
women within these are even less likely to inherit or own property (Gah, 1995) (Mumtaz
and Noshirwani, 2007).
Mobility: The rise and influence of religion-based forces are additional factors in the way
of women’s empowerment, especially affecting their mobility. According to Pakistan
Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPPA), women felt that religion and the issue of
protecting their honour restricted their mobility. In FATA, women are not only unable
to access health services but are now restrained from farm work. A study of women’s
autonomy in rural Punjab reconfirms limited mobility: ‘The three dimensions to the
problem are that they need to seek permission to go to certain places; restrictions on
going alone to various places and the need to observe purdah’ (Sathar and Kazi, 1997).
Pakistani women’s secondary position is reflected in the poor female literacy rate (40
percent in 2004–05) compared to that of males (65 percent); a high maternal mortality
ratio (450 per 100,000) besides perhaps the highest morbidity rate in Asia. Women’s life
expectancy is barely equal to that of men’s (65 years for women and 64 for men) and the
country is one of the few in the world to have a negative sex ratio (100 women to 108
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men). Also, participation in Pakistan is particularly low, with only 16 percent of women
in active employment, compared to 35 percent in India, 23 percent in Bangladesh, 40
percent in Sri Lanka, and over 78 percent in Nepal (Bank, 2004). Among the four
provinces of Pakistan, female labour force participation is lowest in the province of Khy-
ber Pakhtunkhwa having only 36.3 percent as compared to Sind which is 42.75 percent,
43.6 percent in Baluchistan, and 48.5 percent in Punjab. Although, participation rate
has increased gender wise as a whole in the country, it is still low at just 14 percent for
female compared to 49.3 percent for male, while the unemployment rate is 8.5 percent
for female and 4.3 percent for male (Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2000).
According to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2006-07, the illiterate working age pop-
ulation in Pakistan is 50.17 million out of which 62.6 percent are females. As a result
majority of women falls in unpaid family worker and unemployed categories, where 64
percent of all working women were located in the agricultural sector. In comparison, the
share of all working men in agriculture was a much lower 36 per cent. Moreover, they
are less likely than men to participate in labour market particularly in paid work.
One explanation for women’s low labour force participation in South Asia rests on the
classic U hypothesis, which postulates that in the aggregate, female participation rates
tend to be higher when an economy is organized around family based production in
agriculture. In developing countries like Pakistan, the cost of living is increasing in
both urban and rural areas due to increasing demand for education, health services and
consumer durables. The income of male members of the household may not be suffi-
cient to maintain the standard of living. As a consequence, the demand for females in
the labour force increases in order to contribute their share to household rising budget.
Conversely, With economic growth and increased urbanization, participation often de-
clines as women stay at home and men go out to work. At still higher levels of income
per capita, female participation rises again as labour market options for women increase
(Das, 2006).
Previous literature examining the labour supply in South Asia shows that for men, the
likelihood for being in the labour force increases with education but for women there is a
significant decline with higher levels of education (Das and Desai, 2003). The following
explanations can be articulated for South Asian women’s low labour force participation
– the first is a demand side argument which postulates that the supply of well-paying,
secure jobs for educated women is low. Hence educated women, who also belong to the
higher socioeconomic strata, prefer to opt out of the labour force, rather than accept
low status jobs in the informal sector. The second - supply side argument - rests on
cultural norms and values of the region which may prevent higher status households
from allowing women to join the labour force (Das, 2006).
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Determinants of Female Labour Force Participation in South Asia
Years of Education: Much of the early research on labour supply argued that, in de-
veloped countries, there is a positive relationship between education and labour force
participation as education increases productivity and thus wages in the workplace. Stud-
ies in 1960s when female employment began to rise in the United States as well as more
recent studies show that women with higher education are more likely to be employed
than women with lower education (Bowen and Finnegan, 1960) (Cain, 1966) (Tienda
and Cordero-Guzman, 1992). But this result does not hold true for developing coun-
tries as most studies show that education has an opposite impact, i.e. labour force
participation of women declines with education (Kingdon and Unni for India (Kingdon
and Unni, 2001), Fafchamps and Quisumbing for Pakistan (Fafchamps and Quisumbing,
1997), and Das and Desai for India (Das and Desai, 2003)). Education is potentially
related to employment through both income and substitution effects. In assortive mat-
ing, educated women marry educated men with higher income forming a high-income
household. Women in such marriages prefer to withdraw from work or not join at all
as the household does not need their income contribution. Conversely, educated women
are expected to receive higher incomes than less educated women, which lead to positive
participation rates. However, the effect of education on wages may be weaker in Pakistan
than elsewhere because of discrimination in the labour market where the market wage
premium is fairly small for educated women. In Pakistan, there are few jobs for women
in regular salaried or formal jobs – either as office workers or as factory workers, resulting
in women’s concentration in the informal sector. Thus, the salary gains to education are
relatively small. Moreover, many educated women prefer withdrawing from the labour
market to work in menial jobs as casual labourers or on family farms. Fafchamps and
Quisumbing study the effects of human capital on productivity and labour allocations
in rural Pakistan, finding that education is associated with higher probability of being
in non-farm work for men, but not for women (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1997).
In South Asian countries, a woman’s decision of to enter or exit the labour market is
affected by the characteristics of the head of the household, usually the husband or the
father. The household heads’ education level, earnings, employment status and type
determine the socio-economic status of the household which ultimately affects the par-
ticipation of women in the labour market. Wages act in two effects: the substitution
effect and the income effect. The substitution effect is positively correlated with work-
force participation for men as higher wages mean higher incentives to work. The income
effect works in the opposite direction, as higher income means workers can afford leisure.
Hence, women who have husbands from the high income group prefer to stay home due
to a negative income effect. Studies carried out in South Asia show that increases in
husband’s income and education level lowers the probability of women being employed.
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Only after controlling for husband’s income, the relation between education level and
paid work participation becomes positive. That is, it follows a U curve where participa-
tion rate is higher for uneducated women, and then it falls as education level rises, and
rises again with higher levels of education. Thus, as education level for women rises,
the husband’s income exerts a downward pressure on wife’s labour force participation.
Bordia Das finds that husband’s education as well as his wages lowers the probability
of women being employed. Sultana et. al., Blattman and Annan, Khan and Khan have
also found similar results. They argue that the driving force behind this relationship is a
pure income effect; uneducated husbands have low productivity (and thus low earnings)
in the labour market and thus the women of the household are pushed into the labour
market. It may also be postulated that uneducated husbands/household heads have
more children compared to educated husbands; therefore the household is more likely to
be poor. If the total household income is low, women are more likely to join the labour
force (Sultana et al., 1994) (Blattman and Annan, 2010) (Das, 2006) (Khan and Khan,
2009).
Household size: Two alternative hypotheses have been postulated about the effect of
household size on female labour force participation. First, in larger households there
are likely to be multiple male earners, and thus, in the presence of labour market dis-
crimination, there is little need for labour force participation by women. Secondly,
larger households have more mouths to feed, so women may have to be economically
active in order to provide for dependent children or parents. Also, in larger households,
other family members (elder daughters, sisters, mother, and/or the mothers-in-law) may
contribute to housekeeping and child-care, enabling women to join the labour market.
Household composition, as well as size plays an important role in female labour force
participation, as mothers of young children are more likely to remain at home. Previ-
ous research has found that the locality of the household has a significant effect on the
labour force participation of women (Salway, Rehman, and Jesmin for Bangladesh (Sal-
way and Jesmin, 2003); Fleischer and Applebaun for Israel (Fleischer and Applebaun,
1992)). Rural women in Pakistan are more likely to participate in economic activities
than urban women because there are fewer barriers to female employment in farm work
or manual labour than to jobs in the secondary or tertiary sectors (Jamil, 2001). The
refined participation rate for females is 16.8 percent in rural areas and 10.0 percent in
urban areas8.
Studies on Pakistan’s female LFP
Only a few studies analyse the factors affecting female participation rates in Pakistan.
Shah examines the changing role of women in Pakistan between 1951 and 1981, and
8Federal Bureau of Statistics - Pakistan, 2003
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concludes that a female’s labour force participation decision is inversely related to her
family’s socioeconomic status, as indicated by ownership of durable goods, her husband’s
level of education, and observance of purdah9 (Shah et al., 1986). Shah et al. examine
some of the socioeconomic and demographic factors that determine female participation
rates decisions for all four provinces in Pakistan. Their results show that labour force
participation has a significant and inverse relationship with the nuclear family and the
child-woman ratio. However, some studies have found a positive relationship between
female participation rates and marital status, the dependency ratio, and literacy rate
(Shah et al., 1986). Chishti et al. present a case study of Karachi whereby they analyse
the demographic and socioeconomic factors that affect female participation rates. Their
results show that labour force participation is positively related to an increase in ex-
pected earnings, wages, and level of education (Chishti et al., 1989). Another interesting
observation is that the presence of a male figure in the household reduces the likelihood
of female participation rates. However, the presence of other females in the household
increases the probability that a female might work. Ibraz focuses on rural Pakistan, and
observes that various cultural practices, such as purdah, constrain females from active
participation in the labour force (Irbaz, 1993). Naqvi and Shahnaz have conducted a
similar study and identified household-related factors that lead to female participation
in economic activities. Empirical findings suggest that females’ economic participation
is significantly influenced by factors such as age, level of education, and marital status
(Naqvi and Shahnaz, 2002). Ejaz investigates factors that determine female participa-
tion rates in Pakistan by using a sample of females aged 15–49. The results suggest that
age and educational attainment have significant and positive effects on female partici-
pation rates. The results also show that single women have higher participation rates
than married women. The greater the probability of a female belonging to a nuclear
family and having access to a vehicle, the more likely she is to participate in economic
activities, whereas a large number of children and the availability of home appliances
reduces the probability of female participation rates. In terms of the effect of a nuclear
family, Ejaz’s results contradict those of Shah et al. Reducing the burden of childcare
on females and facilitating their education is likely to lead to higher female participation
rates in Pakistan. The available literature shows that various economic and sociological
factors have a significant effect on female participation rates. However, some impor-
tant factors have been neglected, especially those relating to household issues such as
empowerment, fertility, and family structure. The present study, therefore, attempts
to identify and present a comprehensive analysis of all such factors (Shah et al., 1986)
(Ejaz, 2007).
9See chapter 2, footnote 6
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Effects of Violence/Conflict:
Wars and civil conflicts have substantial destructive impacts on human capital formation,
infrastructure, institutions, output, and growth at the country-level, yet the evidence
of their impacts at the micro-level is mixed. Most articles in this growing literature
analyse the effects of conflict on a variety of individual and household level outcomes
and generally find significant impacts on some, but not all, outcomes of interest. The
existing literature on the impact of conflict on individual and household outcomes focuses
primarily on the outcomes of children (Stewart and Wang, 2001) (Collier, 1999a) (Collier
et al., 2003) (Hoeffer and Reynal-Querol, 2003). A brief summary of the mechanisms of
effects of violence and findings of previous research are discussed below:
Female LFP and Terrorism - Direction of causal effect: In order to identify the factors
which have a significant relationship with violence, it is critical to establish the direction
of any causal effects. Caprioli found that states characterized by gender inequality and
structural hierarchy exhibit patterns of violence and hence were more likely to experi-
ence intrastate conflict between 1960 and 2001 (Caprioli, 2005). Robison et al. use the
ideology of terrorist groups to identify Leftist and Islamist transnational terrorist attacks
between 1973 and 2002. They proposed that female labour force participation might
influence terrorism, especially religious terrorism, as the freedom/liberation of women
can be seen as a threat to groups where gender relations are viewed as divinely ordained.
They find evidence that increased female labour force participation was negatively as-
sociated with Islamist attacks. In a following study, Robison revised the hypothesis in
line with previous results where women in public society exert a non-violent influence
which reduces terrorism (Robison, 2010) (Robison and Jenkins, 2006).
Other research provides evidence in support of the direction of an effect from terrorism
to female participation rates. Berrebi and Klor found in Israel that terrorism had a
significant negative impact on non-defence-related companies while displaying a signif-
icantly positive effect on defence-related companies. The effects that terrorism has on
these industries could manifest in female employment if terrorism differentially affects
industries that employ a disproportionate number of males over females or vice versa. If
industries that are negatively affected by terrorism employ a larger share of women, fe-
male labour force participation may be more affected by the terrorist attacks than male
labour force participation. Additionally, if women occupy more precarious positions in
industries negatively affected by terrorism, these industries may shed those jobs first
during difficult times following an attack (Berrebi and Klor, 2010). In 2010 the United
Nations World Tourism Organization reported that the women make up a large propor-
tion of the formal tourism workforce, specifically in service and clerical jobs within the
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industry, though they are poorly represented at the professional levels 10. Some studies
on the subject of terrorism and tourism have documented a significant deleterious rela-
tionship between the two (Thompson, 2011) (Enders et al., 1992) (Sandler and Enders,
2008). These connections provide a clear basis for a directional effect of terrorism onto
female labour force participation. The employment sectors in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa
that would likely have been most affected by the presence of terrorist would be manu-
facturing, health11, education12, small business, and tourism13, all of which are highly
female-intensive (Sadaquat and Sheikh, 2010).
Added worker effect: In the absence of a formal credit market or social insurance, women
in the household are expected to join the labour force in order to smooth household
income and make up for the loss in their husbands’ earnings due to war-related disrup-
tions, departures, injuries, or deaths. Empirical evidence from industrialized countries
suggests that the added worker effect was strong during the Great Depression and World
War II (Acemoglu and Lyle, 2004) (Finegan and Margo, 1994) (Prieto-Rodriguez and
Rodriguez-Gutierrez, 2003). Prior research in developing countries has found some evi-
dence of an added worker effect, but the effects fluctuate in size and have fixated mainly
on economic crises rather than conflict or terrorism. Parker and Skoufias, and McKen-
zie found fairly large added worker effects for Mexico during the 1994 Peso crisis and
Argentina’s financial crisis of 2002. Cho and Newhouse, in contrast, find a relatively
smaller effect for seventeen middle-income economies during the 2009 economic crisis.
Cross-country studies point to the counter-cyclicality of women’s labour supply in de-
veloping countries, especially in Asia and Latin America (McKenzie, 2004) (Bhalotra
and Umana-Aponte, 2010) (Parker and Skoufias, 2004) (Signorelli et al., 2012) (Cho
and Newhouse, 2013).
Poverty: Violence-related shocks can significantly exacerbate on the poverty status of
households. Wars, terrorism and civil conflict not only cause human fatalities, they also
destroy infrastructure, assets and livelihoods, and displace populations. These effects
are likely to push the worse-hit households into extreme poverty, even if these households
were not poor off to begin with The literature identifies several coping strategies for such
households: they may use of savings in the form household assets in order to diversify
income resort to informal mutual support networks e.g. family, friends, ethnic groups,
and neighbours, or intra-household decisions such as cutting meals and portions, relying
10United Nations World Tourism Organization, 2010
11A large number of door-to-door health workers are women. There have been numerous incidents of
attacks on vaccination teams in KPK
12The Taliban targeted female employment in education by bombing girls’ schools in KPK
13Swat has always been a top summer resort in KPK, attracting travellers from all over the country.
When the Taliban took over, many tourist attractions were destroyed.
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on wild foods and moving to food camps (Shemyakina, 2006) (Justino and Verwimp,
2006) (de Walque, 2004) (Fafchamps and Czukas, 1998) (Barrett and Webb., 2001).
Death within the household: Deaths and injuries within the household are some of the
most visible effects of violent conflicts, requiring significant adaptation by the members.
Donovan et. al. research the effect of adult deaths on 1500 rural Rwandan households
using survey of self-reported coping strategies. They found that some households sell
assets, adjust their crop mix, adjust area planted or hire more labour. The effect on
farm labour supply was dominant: 6 out of 10 (5 out of 10) households reported a
reduction in farm labour due to a male (female) adult death and 50 (80) percent of
households reported no effect on other income generating activities for a male (female)
death. Beegle, researching the effect of adult mortality on the labour supply of Tanzanian
households, did not find an increase in hours farmed by surviving household members
after an adult death, but found decreased activity in the farming. The author draws
attention to the fact that households experiencing decreased output or profit after an
adult death not necessarily experience a reduction of income, production or consumption
per capita (Justino and Verwimp, 2006) (et. al., 2003) (Beegle, 2005).
Effects on Children: Akresh and de Walque exploit variation across provinces in the
intensity of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and find that school-age children exposed to
the genocide complete almost one-half year less schooling and are 15 percentage points
less likely to complete third or fourth grade (Akresh and de Walque, 2008). Blattman
finds that child soldiering increases political participation in Northern Uganda but it
does not appear to affect non-political community participation. Blattman and Annan
study additional consequences of child soldiering in Northern Uganda and find that
former child soldiers’ loss in schooling is about equal to the length of time of abduction
into the rebel group. Furthermore, they find that child soldiering halves the likelihood
of skilled employment and decreases earnings by one third but has little impact on
psychological problems, aggression, and social exclusion (Blattman and Annan, 2010).
Akresh and Verwimp find that girls born after a shock during Rwanda’s civil conflict
exhibit 0.72 standard deviations lower height for age z-scores while there is no impact
on boys’ health status. Merrouche for Cambodia, Shemyakina for Tajikistan, Lopez and
Wodon for Rwanda, de Walque for Cambodia, Bundervoet and Verwimp for Burundi,
and Stewart et. al. for Sub-Saharan African countries from 1960 until 1990, all find that
enrolment levels rebounded after crisis in their respective study areas (Shemyakina, 2006)
(de Walque, 2004) (Lopez and Wodon, 2005) (Merrouche, 2007) (Akresh and Verwimp,
2006).
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3.4 Data Description
The main source of data for this study is the five rounds of the Pakistan Social and
Living Standards Measurement survey collected from 2004 to 2009. The PSLM is an
annual nationally-representative survey conducted since 2004-05. The survey is carried
out annually in all four provinces, although the tribal region is not present in all rounds.
The survey is organised at the level of the household and covers education, health, social
capital, fertility and marriage, employment, and economic status. This study relies on
data from only Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa province, which was the primary area of Taliban
presence. The fieldwork for the fourth round of the PSLM was conducted in Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa between July, 2007 and June, 2008. The fieldwork for the fifth round was
conducted in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa between August, 2008 and June, 2009 and in Swat
between January, 2009 and June, 2009. This coincides roughly the military operation
which began in January of the same year and ended in July.
Table 3.1 shows variable definitions, their coding, and expected signs. The depen-
dant variables for my estimation are a series of employment status dummies, covering
whether a women is in work or, alternatively, in specific types of work (paid employment,
self-employment, agricultural employment, and unpaid employment). To measure the
intensity of attacks, I have created dummy variables for residence in high and low inten-
sity districts. High intensity districts are defined by twenty or more reported terrorist
incidents in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data (Dir, Swat, Bannu, Hangu, Ko-
hat, Dera Ismail Khan, and Peshawar). Similarly, low intensity districts are defined by
1-1914 reported school attacks in the GTD data (Malakand, Mardan, Charsadda, Buner,
Nowshera, Shangla, Mansehra, Swabi, Tank, and Chitral). No attacks districts are the
remaining six districts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa with no reported terrorist incidents in
the GTD data (Karak, Abbotabad, Batagram, Kohistan, Haripur, and Lakki Marwat)
(See figure 3.1). The remaining variables are the standard determinants of employment
in developing countries, which are discussed extensively in the literature section.
The data for terrorist incidents comes from South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and
the GTD, which have detailed information on terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2011.
This data is disaggregated at district level by intensity of terrorist attacks. Figure 3.2
shows a sudden increase in terrorist attacks after 2006 and a decline after 2009. Much
of the decline from 2009 onwards can be attributed to a sharp decrease in the number
of terrorist attacks in Swat, as a result of Operation Rah-e-Rast, in which the military
regained control of the area. Incidents beyond 2009 were predominantly carried out in
Peshawar district.
14The affected districts had either very few terrorist incidents or very high, hence any cut-off between
say 15 and 40 would classify high and low essentially the same way.
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The descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest are presented in table 3.2.
The top panel shows the sample statistics for the years 2004 to 2006 (before attacks)
while the bottom panel shows the sample for the years 2007 to 2009 (during and after
attacks). The first reported attacks were from June, 2007 while the survey for the year
2007-08 was conducted from July, 2007 to June 2008, during the time period when
the Taliban were in control of Swat. The fieldwork for the last round of the survey was
carried out in KPK till 2009, just after the spring army offensive in Swat and the Taliban
had been cleared from the district. This allows me to examine the short term impact of
exposure to terrorist activities in the worst affected districts.
Table 3.3 shows the proportion of women in employment for the sample years for the
entire country and by province. In the year 2008-09, the level of employment went down
by roughly 6 percent, while in KPK the employment went down from 22 to 18 percent
in the last two survey years. This shows the overall business cycle had an independent
effect on employment in Pakistan. Table 3.4 gives the breakdown of employment by
type, gender, and province for the survey years used in this paper, 2004-2009. Most
of the woemn employed are unapid workers. In KPK province, half of the women
employed are in unpaid work. Table 3.5 shows the employment rates in the entire
province, higher intensity, low intensity, and no attack districts prior and subsequent
to the Taliban campaign. It can be seen that employment decreased in the later years
for all cohorts in all types of work, reflecting a trend in the data due to the business
cycle where unemployment in the country increased from 5 percent to 5.2 percent in
200915. In the full sample of KPK, the overall employment gender differential is 0.44
percent. For different types of work, the raw difference-in-difference for women is about 2
percent less than that of men. For other forms of work (self-employment, farm work and
paid employment), the differences are negligible. Restricting the sample by intensity
level does not change the direction of the differences. In high intensity districts, the
overall difference employment is slightly positive for women. For the different types
of employment, the only negative difference is for women in paid work by 2.7 percent,
while in low intensity and no attacks districts the difference in between negative 1.5
to 1.75 percent. In other forms of work, the differences are again miniscule. Table
3.5 implies that the cohort of women who were affected by the terrorist attacks has
lower rates of employment in paid work than previous cohorts. These results provide
preliminary evidence that the employment rates of women in affected districts may have
been somewhat adversely affected by terrorist violence.
15Pakistan Employment Trends, 2012
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3.5 Empirical strategy/Model specifications
The determinants of labour force participation are estimated by using the binary probit
model, with robust standard errors. The probit model is appropriate as the dependent
variable is discrete, rather than continuous. The model estimates the probability that
the dependent variable (employment) is equal to one, given a set of characteristics. This
probability of being currently employed is regressed with several covariates in the model
gathered in a vector X,
P [LFP = 1] = F (Xβ) and P [LFP = 0] = 1− F (Xβ)
where β measures the effect of changes in the independent variables on the probability
of the discrete dependent variable of employment status.
General representation of the model:
The identification strategy used in this paper exploits the variation in intensity of terror-
ist presence and activities across districts of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa during 2007-2009.
The employment level in districts which experienced no attacks act as a control group
for what employment would have looked like in the absence of terrorism. To identify an
individual’s exposure to violence, they are matched with their district of residence and
year. The baseline specification is presented below:
P [Ei] = (Female)µ+ (Treated Y ears)ξ + (Intensity)τ + (Intensity ∗
Treated Y ears)γ + (Intensity ∗ Female)η + (Female ∗ Treated Y ears)θ +
(High Intensity ∗ Treated Y ears ∗ Female)δ + β(Xi)
where the dependant variable is Ei which measures the employment status of individual
i and female is the gender of the individual i. The employment variable is divided
into five types of employment; any form of work, paid work, self-employment, farm
work, or unpaid work. Overall employment variable is a dummy which equals 1 if the
individual is employed, regardless of type. All employment definitions follow the HIES
report of 201316. A person is considered employed if they worked for at least one hour
during the month, had a job, or ran an enterprise such as shop, business, farm or service
establishment during the last year.
If the Taliban’s demand that women should quit paid work and remain at home was
successful, it’s expected that, in the affected districts and time periods, women would
16HouseholdIntegrated Economic Survey of Pakistan,2013
Chapter 3. The Taliban and Female Employment in North-western Pakistan 50
either completely drop out of the labour force or switch from paid employment to farm
work, unpaid work, or home-based self-employment. Intensity is a vector of dummies
(low, high) for attack intensity level in district of residence. Districts that didn’t ex-
perience any terrorist presence are the omitted group in the regressions. The intensity
level dummies are further restricted by two exposure survey years, 2007-08 and 2008-09,
as the pattern of attacks was very different in these two years as can be seen in figure
2. This exogenous shock allows for a difference-in-difference-in-difference comparison of
the terrorist presence in the periods 2007-08 and 2008-09. If the attacks affected the
employment of women, I expect to find a negative coefficient for the triple interaction
variables. Treated years is a dummy variable for whether the individual was surveyed in
2007-08 or 2008-09. Observations from 2004-06 are used as the control. The year dum-
mies (2007-08 and 2008-09) and district intensity dummies (High Intensity and Low
intensity) control for the effects of treatment years and treatment districts that are con-
stant across all individuals in the sample. The interaction of intensity level and survey
year gives the difference-in-difference estimates on the effects of intensity level in the
year of employment. The triple interaction of female with treatment years and district
intensity level is the variable of interest in the regressions, measuring the gender-specific
impact of residing in regions that experienced terrorism after 2007 after controlling for
cohort, gender and conflict effects individually and their interactions. β(Xi) includes
standard individual and household-level characteristics motivated by the discussion in
the previous section. These include region, household size, parental education and in-
come, household head’s income and education, number of children in the household,
number of family members in employment, and marital status. The expected signs on
the coefficients of these variables are shown in table 3.1.
3.6 Results of Estimation
The regression estimates are presented in table 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9. Table 3.6 gives
the estimate for full sample, while rest of the tables carry out robustness checks using
several specifications for young individuals aged 18 or younger, aged 19 or older, married
individuals, and single individuals. The discussion on the estimates is presented as under.
Individual’s characteristics: The results on controls are generally in line with the expec-
tations in table 3.1. Employment exhibits an inverted U-shape as age increases, which
is a standard outcome for increase in age. Older individuals are less likely to be in
labour force as age increases, hinting towards an inverted U-shape of the employment
curve. It is worth noting that as age has a positive effect on employment for all forms
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of work for individuals approaching 18 years of age, where the net effect of age17 is
increasing as age approaches 1818. Years of education19 has a positive coefficient for
all forms of work except farm work and unpaid work. This result is intuitive as only
very young labourers are used as unpaid worker, who would have no education. Next,
marriage increases the probability of being employed in all forms of work except unpaid
work. This corresponds with the results in table 3.7 where only younger individuals are
positively employed in unpaid work. Most of the married individuals in the sample are
aged 18 or older. Moreover, married individuals with families would want some sort of
remunerations for work. For the full sample, parents’ education decreases employment
in all types of work. In educated families, it is expected that education is given priority
over low paying jobs. Therefore, these individuals would pursue education and not be
in work. Parents’ income increases overall employment of those aged 19 or older. For
single individuals, parents’ education decreases probability of employment for all types
of work. Fathers and mother’s education, both have a negative coefficient, meaning more
educated families don’t have younger family members in work. Education and income
of household head decreases the probability of employment for women in all forms of
employment (income effect).
Household characteristics: The probability for being employed is a decreasing function
of household size at all levels of employment except unpaid work. Larger households in
Pakistan are a rural phenomenon where people live in joint families. Poorer households
do engage in unpaid work such as bonded farm workers or village landlords’ servants who
are paid in kind rather than money. Complementarily, as the number of children in the
household increases (holding household size constant), the probability of employment for
all type of work also increases. This is likely because more children mean fewer family
members who are capable of employment, and also more mouths to feed. Location of
residence has the expected signs in all specifications20: overall, the probability of being in
17 Net effect of age: The knowledge and experience that accumulates with age can partially offset any
decrease in cognitive functioning that may also occur with age, such that the net effect of age can be
negative for older individuals.
18In this group, younger individuals are intuitively less likely to be working, especially in paid employ-
ment as younger individuals are in education. The result is only positive for individuals in unpaid work;
many unpaid farm and family workers are children of farmers/labourers who are working as bonded
labourers. As age gets closer to 18, the employment variable for all types becomes positive. Older
children are have more opportunities for paid work or self-employment, hence the positive coefficient on
these types of employment.
19For single individuals, years in education increase the probability to be employed in paid and self-
employment while negative for farm employment. This is intuitive as single people usually live with their
parents. Since the parents or other married family members are in work, single individuals have the
option to drop out of employment and pursue other options such as education. For married individuals,
years of education increases probability of being employed in paid and self-employment for both men
and women while decreases employment in farm and paid work.
20It is worth mentioning that younger individuals are less likely to be employed in urban areas. It is
likely that young individuals in urban areas are still in education. As for married individuals, living in
an urban area increases probability of employment for men but decreases for women.
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employment in urban areas in negative while types of work give expected outcome, with
more likelihood to be employed in paid and self-employment while less probability to be
employed in farm or unpaid work. This is highly intuitive as Pakistan is an agricultural
economy with more people employed in rural farms while urban settings have more
opportunities for businesses and formal paid employment. This is in line with previous
research discussed in section 3. Finally, on the gender interaction variables, girls are less
likely to be employed in all forms of work. Younger females in Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa
practice purdah and less likely to engaged in employment. Usually, younger women are
engaged in housework or looking after younger siblings. Interaction of female and number
of family members in work is positive for paid and self-employment while negative for
farm and unpaid work. Interaction of gender with parents’ education and income gives
expected outcomes. Married women are less likely to be employed in all forms of work
while men are more likely to be employed in paid and self-work.
Variables of interest/Difference-in-Difference estimates: The baseline probabilities of
overall employment were higher in both high and low intensity areas relative to the zero-
attack areas. These districts include Peshawar, Swat, and Dera Ismael Khan, which are
highly populous districts with large metropolitan areas. It is expected that employment
would be high in these areas as there are more opportunities for all forms of work. There
is a negative coefficient on employment for the year 2008-09, indicating that the effect on
the probability of being in employment drops from 3 percent in 2007-08 to -3.5 percent
in 2008-09, which can be attributed to the business cycle of 2009. After controlling for
gender in the double interaction difference-in-difference variable, the gender differential
in employment in the treated years remains, with women less likely to be employed than
men in both treatment years. The gender-year interaction coefficient goes from 1121
percent to -4 percent in the years 2007-08 to 2008-09. This negative effect in 2008-09
holds for all forms of work, implying that the economic recession hit women worse than
men. As for second difference-in-difference term, the gender-intensity level interaction,
women in both low and high intensity area are less likely to be employed than men in
overall employment, self-employment, and unpaid work.
The main variables of interest are the triple interaction difference-in-difference-in-difference
terms. The coefficient for women in high and low intensity areas in 2007-08 is negative
for overall employment for the full sample (column 1), with a value in the range of 6
percent to 7 percent. In the second year of the attacks, the negative effect of overall em-
ployment seems to disappear for low intensity districts. For high intensity district, the
negative effect decreases from 7 to 1.5 percent. This result is in line with the estimates
of the education chapter, where the fear-effect of terrorism quickly diminishes after the
21This positive coefficient is mostly driven by women in unpaid work. For all other forms of paid work
(farm and nonfarm), the gender differential is negative in all years.
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first year of the attacks. After the onset of the terrorist activities in 2007-08, female
workers are dissuaded from work. They soon return to work as the terrorist activities
get weakened due to the military operations22. When restricted by employment type
(columns 2-5), this negative result remains for paid work and farm work. In high in-
tensity areas, the probability of being employed in paid work for women decreases by 1
percent in the second year of attacks while the probability of unpaid work increases by 1
percent. It is likely that these women switched to competing activities; younger women
dropped out of work in favour of education and household work and older women opt-
ing for household work in place of paid work. After losing opportunities for paid work,
women could switch jobs by taking up unpaid work in place of paid or self-employment.
The results suggest that the Taliban attacks had only a modest and short-lived effect on
female employment levels. The estimates for regression by age group and marital status
give a similar result.
Robustness check: In order to establish that the results for the full sample hold for
different specifications and are not driven by the controls, a number of sample groups
are used to run the employment model. First, I run the regressions for sample of 18
year olds or younger individuals, and over 18 years old individuals. Lastly, I split the
sample by marital status i.e. married (currently married, divorced, or widowed) and
single (never married). The division of the sample at age 18 is made as this is the
normal end of higher secondary schooling, marking a discrete change in terms of time
use options. Individuals aged 18 or younger are of school going age. Those who are not
in education are likely to be in unskilled or unpaid work. For further check, the sample
is divided by marital status. The literature for developing countries suggests marital
status correlates with participation rates, marriage increases labour force participation
for men, but decreases it for women. Married individuals are likely to behave differently
in the labour market decisions than single individuals. Therefore, tables 3.7 and 3.8
examine employment of married and unmarried individuals separately. The significant
results with these modified specifications are upheld.
Tables 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 show the regression results split by age and marital status. The
control variables are the same as in table 3.6; however, in the interest of expediency,
these coefficients are not reported. In the triple interaction difference-in-difference-in-
difference term for the age group samples, in both high and low intensity areas, women
are less likely to be employed in the first year of the attacks for overall employment.
The coefficient for 19 year olds or older is between -14 and -16 percent in 2007-08, which
becomes insignificant in 2008-09. For the sample of 18 or younger, the result has the
same direction but smaller magnitude. For types of work, there is a negative effect in
22See chapter 2 for details on the military operations
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unpaid work and farm work for 18 and 19 in year 2007-08. In the following year, the
negative effect only stays for paid and while it’s positive for unpaid work. For women
aged 19 or older, the negative effect remains for paid employment in high intensity
districts while it stays for farm work and unpaid work in low intensity districts. In gist,
there is a slight negative gender differential for women in paid work, which is offset by
a positive gender differential in unpaid work in the treatment districts. This affect is
more pronounced for younger women, and suggests that much of the adjustment to the
attacks occurred by women switching from more formal to less formal work, rather than
leaving the labour force.
For the samples by marital status, both single and married women are less likely to be
employed in the high and low intensity districts while the opposite is true for men. For
the sample of men in paid work, there is a positive effect in the first year of attacks
which increases slightly in the second year. Men’s participation rates were not affected
by the conflict in the region. For men in farm work, there is a negative effect in both
years which slightly decreases in 2008-09. For married women, the overall employment
has a negative probability, which is consistent with existing theories on labour supply
behaviour of married women. In the difference-in-difference terms, there is a negative
effect in overall employment in both low and high intensity areas. This effect disappears
in the second year in both high and low intensity districts. There is though a small
negative effect in farm work in high intensity districts and in paid work, farm work and
unpaid work in low intensity districts.
Lastly, for the sample of single individuals, in the double interaction difference-in-
difference terms, there is a negative effect for the first year of attacks in all forms of
employment for both genders. By type of employment, there is only a negative gen-
der differential for farm and unpaid work in both high and low intensity districts. In
the second year, the negative effect disappears for overall employment, though there is
some negative differential for unpaid and farm work. In gist, single women and married
women experienced a decrease in relative employment in the first year of the attacks,
which fades away in the following year, although there is a negligible negative effect on
farm and unpaid work.
To summarize the regression estimates, for overall employment in the full sample re-
gression, there is a coefficient of -7 percent for difference-in-difference-in-difference term.
This increases slightly in the following year to -1.6 percent. In the low intensity area,
the difference-in-difference-in-difference coefficient goes from -6 percent insignificant in
the year 2007-08 to insignificant and very small in the following survey year. In the age
group samples, the outcome is very similar with a negative gender differential in the year
2007-08 which disappears in the year 2008-09. Lastly, for the samples by marital status,
Chapter 3. The Taliban and Female Employment in North-western Pakistan 55
both samples experienced a decreasing probability of employment in 2007-08 in high
intensity and low intensity areas with coefficients ranging between 1 and 2 percent for
single and 4 to 5.5 percent for married individuals, which disappears in the year 2008-09.
These results suggest that the Taliban attacks had only a modest and short-lived effect
on female employment levels in the affected areas of Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa.
3.7 Conclusion
This study takes a step towards understanding the impact of terrorist activities in North-
western Pakistan since 2007 on women’s employment. The Taliban insurgency in the
North-western regions of Pakistan specifically threatened the participation of women
in the labour market, as one of the main goals of their terror campaign was to keep
women at home. I examine the employment rates of women and men in the Khyber
Pukhtoonkhwa province by using five consecutive rounds of the Pakistan Standards of
Living Measurement survey.
The empirical strategy uses a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach, comparing
the differences in employment across three dimensions, gender, district (separated by
intensity of attacks), and years. The results suggest that the impact of these terrorist
attacks was relatively modest and short-lived. For instance, females aged 18 or younger
in the districts of North-western Pakistan that experienced terrorist incidents between
2007 and 2009 had 1.56 percent lower employment rates relative to men in the first year
of attacks. In the following year, when the Pakistani military retook control over some
of the affected areas, this effect fades away. There is a very small negative effect for paid
work for women in the affected districts but overall employment level does not seem to
show a decrease in employment rates.
The results presented here speak differently than what is popularly believed; suggesting
the fear effect of the Taliban’s terrorism campaign was relatively modest. There is no
evidence for a substantial drop in the labour force participation rates in the worst affected
districts. There is a relatively small effect estimated for women in paid employment in
the years of highest-intensity terrorist attacks, followed by a rapid return to normality
in overall employment after the Pakistani counterinsurgency measures in 2009. These
results are congruous with the estimates of education outcomes in the same districts:
the impact of these terrorist attacks was only short-lived.
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Figure 3.1: Intensity level by districts of KPK.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics.
Before Mean Standard dev. Observations
Age 21.79 18.02 143456
Age2 799.64 1196 143456
Household size 9.97 5.47 143456
Urban 0.27 0.44 143456
Years edu 2.57 4.02 143456
Female 0.5 0.5 143456
Married 0.37 0.48 143456
Father edu 3.88 4.99 143456
Mother edu 0.97 2.83 143456
Head edu 3.96 4.99 143456
Head income 4456 9062 143456
Parents’ income 4591 9185 143456
Family members in work 1.92 1.77 143456
Children in hh 4.65 3.4 143456
After Mean Standard dev. Observations
Age 22.28 18.09 113724
Age2 823.31 1193 113724
Household size 9.35 4.8 113724
Urban 0.26 0.44 113724
Years edu 2.68 4.11 113724
Female 0.49 0.5 113724
Married 0.38 0.48 113724
Father edu 3.98 5.04 113724
Mother edu 0.96 2.9 113724
Head edu 4.06 5.05 113724
Head income 7254 11178 113724
Parents’ income 7415 11336 113724
Family members in work 1.45 1.17 113724
Children in hh 4.24 3.03 113724
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Table 3.3: Employment rates in Pakistan, by province
Year 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09
Pakistan 0.2498 0.2808 0.2621 0.2798 0.2134
Punjab 0.2776 0.3022 0.2870 0.3031 0.2310
Sindh 0.2614 0.3156 0.2777 0.3182 0.2176
KPK 0.2048 0.2301 0.2212 0.2250 0.1805
Baloch 0.2261 0.2387 0.2231 0.2364 0.2005
Table 3.4: Percent Employed by type, region, and gender.
PROVINCE Pakistan Punjab Sindh KPK Baloch
Any employment
M 41.40 43.8 43.64 36.17 38.32
F 6.60 9.38 6.04 4.8 2.2
Paid employment
M 20.64 20.51 22.75 18.57 20.14
F 3.04 4.59 2.65 1.78 1.07
Self employment
M 8.90 11.4 7.33 8.22 6.08
F 0.69 1.04 0.43 0.57 0.29
Farm employment
M 8.17 8.12 9.19 6.27 8.96
F 0.67 0.96 0.26 0.83 0.28
Unpaid employment
M 7.40 6.82 8.91 5.01 9.3
F 4.72 5.29 5.96 2.57 4.03
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Table 3.6: Probit regression for full sample by employment type - marginal effects
Full sample Any work Paid emp Self emp Farm work Unpaid work
Age 0.0219*** 8.82e-05*** 0.00219*** 0.00125*** 0.00391***
(0.001) -3.13E-05 -6.00E-05 -4.24E-05 -7.10E-05
Age2 -0.000266*** -2.57e-05*** -1.10e-05*** -5.38e-05***
-2.55E-06 -7.32E-07 -4.21E-07 -1.11E-06
Household size -0.00876*** -0.00147*** 0.000279*** -0.000242*** -0.000374***
(0.001) (0.001) -7.58E-05 -5.87E-05 -9.95E-05
Urban -0.00972*** 0.00998*** 0.00937*** -0.0119*** -0.00977***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.157*** -0.112*** -0.0188*** -0.0239*** -0.0174***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Years edu 0.00768*** 0.00825*** 0.000753*** -0.000559*** 0.000379***
(0.001) (0.001) -5.02E-05 -4.04E-05 -6.37E-05
Married 0.184*** 0.115*** 0.0195*** 0.00839*** -0.0161***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Children in hh 0.00723*** -0.00256*** -0.000223** 0.000434*** -0.000178
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father edu -0.00560*** -0.00302*** -0.000558*** -0.000352*** -0.00145***
(0.001) (0.001) -4.46E-05 -4.16E-05 -6.76E-05
Mother edu -0.00253*** -0.000854*** -0.000155** -0.000541*** -0.000879***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parents’ income 2.86E-08 -4.98e-07*** 8.48e-08*** -4.82e-08*** 2.16e-07***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family members in work 0.0213*** 0.00548*** -0.000572*** -0.000425*** 0.00653***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family members in work*female 0.0128*** 0.00487*** 0.00239*** -0.000808*** 0.000744***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father edu*female 0.000586* 0.00223*** -0.000158 -0.000675*** -0.000371***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother edu*female 0.00548*** 0.00320*** -0.000169 0.000907*** -0.00113***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parents’ income*female 0.00617*** 0.00257*** 0.000626*** 0.00156*** 0.00139***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married*female -0.152*** -0.0541*** -0.0188*** -0.00926*** 0.0170***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High intensity 0.0233*** 0.0108*** 0.00362*** -0.00101 -0.00143
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Low intensity 0.0196*** 0.00801*** 0.00267*** -0.00044 0.00142
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2007-08 0.0307*** 0.00990** -0.00380*** 0.00098 0.00153
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
2008-09 -0.0351*** -7.89E-05 -0.00158** -0.00182*** 0.00459***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female*high intensity -0.0468*** -0.00449 -0.00330*** 0.00028 -0.0159***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female*low intensity -0.0431*** 7.08E-05 -0.00294** -0.000774 -0.0140***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2007-08*female 0.110*** -0.00943 -0.00193 -0.000372 0.0569***
(0.016) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009)
2008-09*female -0.0417*** -0.0132*** -0.0118*** 0.000214 -0.00669***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2007-08*High intensity -0.0158*** 0.00276 -0.00199 -0.00308*** 0.00730**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
2008-09*High intensity 0.00196 0.00628** -0.000651 -0.00113* -0.00572***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2007-08*Low intensity -0.0174*** 0.0141*** -0.000792 -0.00431*** -0.00443**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
2008-09*Low intensity 0.000781 0.00267 -0.000328 0.00125* -0.00266**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2007-08*female*high -0.0723*** 0.000127 -0.00302 -0.00577*** -0.0160***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
2007-08*female*low -0.0615*** -0.00533 -0.00266 0.00114 -0.0131***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
2008-09*female*high -0.0157** -0.0107** -0.00145 -0.00544*** 0.0106***
(0.007) 0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
2008-09*female*low -0.00163 -0.00772 0.00215 -0.00442*** -0.00352*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 257,180 257,180 257,180 257,180 257,180
Pseudo R2 0.4966 0.3019 0.2854 0.3131 0.1754
Prob.Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 4
Minority Status & Income
Determination in Ghana: Testing
the Enclave Effect
4.1 Introduction
There is significant literature across social sciences, which analyses discrimination in
labour markets on the grounds of race and ethnicity. In Ghana, however, little work
has been done in measuring discrimination and what is known comes mainly from qual-
itative studies. Discussions about economic policy between international organisations
and African governments rarely touch upon issues relating to ethnicity. And yet recent
contributions to the literature on cross-country differences in economic performance in-
dicate that ethnic fractionalization, i.e., the segmentation of a population into several
groups that are distinct in terms of language and culture, is associated with very high
economic costs in terms of lower rates of economic growth due to the adoption of dys-
functional macroeconomic policies, lower levels of trust, weak norms of civic cooperation,
and increased probabilities of civil war (Barr and Oduro, 2000) (Collier and Hoeﬄer,
1998) (Easterly and Levine, 1997) (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
Understanding how ethnic diversity can impact the economy at a micro level is a nec-
essary condition for identifying policy interventions. We need to know how and why
ethnic identity and ethnic boundaries affect the economic decisions that people make
during their everyday lives. Through such an investigation we may be able to identify
the conditions under which the negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic outcomes
might be minimised.
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This paper looks at the influence of ethnicity on the decision to enter self employment in
Ghana and the push/pull factors which affect the rewards in the different sectors of em-
ployment. This paper particularly investigates whether non-dominant ethnic group(s)
face discriminatory treatment in the labour market, compared to the dominant eth-
nic group, and to test for the presence of ethnic enclaves. First, I look into factors that
drive ethnic minorities out of formal sector employment. If membership of the dominant
ethnic group leads to a wage premium, all things equal, this hints towards preferential
treatment. That is, I test whether Non-Akans (non-dominant group) living in Akan
(dominant group) regions suffer from detrimental consequences of socio-economic dis-
crimination more than living in Non-Akan regions. In the absence of discrimination in
hiring or wages the formal employment sector, there would be no premium for belonging
to dominant ethnic group. This could be due to government regulations in the formal
sector of Ghana. Alternatively, the Ghana trade Union Congress is actively implement-
ing rules in the public sector (Addai, 2011).
Next, I estimate the influence of ethnicity in the decision to enter non-farm self-employment
as well as the rewards reaped in the non-farm informal sector. The informal sector in
Ghana is composed of small scale organisations and self employed individuals who oper-
ate without the rules and benefits that are present in the paid sector. If minority groups
face discrimination in the paid sector, it is expected that these obstacles would lead to
increased representation of the discriminated group in this sector. The contribution of
this paper is to test for the existence of the Ethnic Enclave effect for Ghana - How does
living in an enclave affect labour market outcomes for the non-dominant groups? If
enclaves are important for self employment, the likelihood of being self-employed is even
higher if non-dominant group is in an ‘enclave’ where members form a network which
raises opportunity of gainful trade. Minority community variables in the Southern and
Northern region are constructed for the ethnic minorities. If minority enclaves exist in
Ghana, I expect to find that minority entrepreneurs who reside in enclaves are more
likely to be in self-employment and achieve greater returns than those minorities who
operate outside of the enclave.
The ethnic groups studied in this paper have been pooled into two major ethnicities:
The dominant group (Akan from the South) and the minority group (Mole Dagbani and
Ewe from the North). The distinction between the Northerners and the Southerners is
the most meaningful ethnic split in Ghana; the Northerners are subordinate to South-
ern Akans in every aspect of social and economic status, such as education, occupation,
income, and political power. Their cultural orientation is more traditional, and most
reside in villages and small towns. The regional segregation between Northerners and
the Southerners represents differential access to opportunities. Northerners are more
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likely than Southerners to reside in small communities and in rural places, where oc-
cupational and economic opportunities are scarce. Consequently, many Northerners in
Ghana search for jobs in Southern towns (Collier, 1999b).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the theoretical background,
section 4.3 provides an analytical review of ethnicity in Ghana, and Section 4.4 discusses
the data and empirical strategy. Section 4.5 analyzes the empirical findings, and Section
4.6 presents conclusions.
4.2 Theoretical background
Discrimination is complex, multifaceted and deeply ingrained in behaviour, and difficult
to measure or quantify. Discrimination is understood to exist when some superficial char-
acteristic is used in an attempt to restrict individuals’ access to the available economic,
political, and social opportunities for advancement (D’Amico, 1987). The targeted dis-
crimination groups may vary, across locations, but in general include: women, immi-
grants, youth, elderly, children, disabled, or LGBT individuals. In the West African
labour market most vulnerable to racial/ethnic discrimination seem to be ethnic and
religious minorities.
Labour market discrimination is define as a situation in which persons who provide
labour market services and who are equally productive in a physical or material sense
are treated unequally in a way that is related to ethnicity (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
The theoretical explanations of labour market discrimination are concerned with how
and why productively-irrelevant characteristics influence the labour market behaviour
of employers and workers (Swinton, 1977). There are several economic theories which
explain discrimination:
Becker focused on the effects of a taste for discrimination. In his model discriminating
employers behave as if the price associated with hiring a worker from the less favoured
group is their wage plus what he calls the coefficient of discrimination. Employers may
practice this taste for discrimination based on different market valuations of group-
specific characteristics. As a result, wage differentials would arise in the presence of
such discriminatory practices on the part of employers and similar workers doing the
same job would be paid differently depending on their social group. In addition, if good
jobs are in short supply and rationed, in the presence of discrimination, employers prefer
to employ dominant ethnic group workers (Becker, 1957).
The Marxist approach views racism as a tactic used by employers to introduce class
cleavages within the working class. Economic gain rather than psychic preference is
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then the main motive for discrimination. Wage discrimination simply pays in terms of
maximizing profits. Jobs are organized to take wage advantage of ethnic workers, and
the tactic is intended to minimize labour costs by weakening the workers’ bargaining
position, or perhaps to stall the worker- stemming long-run threat to the capitalistic sys-
tem. Employers’ wellbeing is therefore improved as they are able to raise their expected
incomes through discrimination (Baran and Sweezy, 1966).
The idea that competition may eventually eliminate discrimination led to the develop-
ment of the statistical discrimination hypothesis . Discrimination results from the profit
maximizing response of employers to uncertainty about the quality of individual workers,
while the real or subjective distributions favour the group which receives preferences.
Stereotyping plays the major role in this approach. Statistical models of discrimination
predict that if employers perceive minority group as being generally less productive than
majority group, and if it is difficult to measure the actual workers’ productivity, then
minority members with above-average productivity may receive below-average returns
(Arrow, 1973) (Phelps, 1972) (Aigner and Cain, 1977).
Phelps argues imperfect information at the hiring stage may translate into lower earn-
ings. For instance, in the presence of imperfect information, employers may be unable
to accurately assess the quality of non-dominant ethnic group workers (Phelps, 1972).
As a result, employers may offer higher wages and higher positions to co-ethnic work-
ers. In the presence of incomplete information, employers may screen candidates on the
basis of perceived differences in productivity. Therefore, workers from non-dominant
ethnic groups must have lower reservation wages in order to compete with otherwise
observationally identical groups. In the Ghanaian context, discrimination of this form
could be leading to both current labour market discrimination and feedback effects and
consequent earnings differentials between members of different ethnic groups (Barr and
Oduro, 2000).
Self-Employment as a consequence of discrimination: If ethnic minorities face the men-
tioned labour market obstacles and if they are unable to obtain formal employment, they
are more likely to be pushed into the involuntary self-employment in the informal sector,
to escape low wages or unemployment. That is, if the rewards in the waged sector are
reduced in the presence of discrimination, minority/migrant workers are less likely to
be found in that sector. This leads to an increased representation of the discriminated
minority groups in the informal/self employment sector. That is, self employment is
the last resort for those denied access to formal work. Taking a less pessimistic view,
ethnic minorities might enter the informal sector voluntarily where they enjoy non-wage
features that maximise utility rather than earnings (Gunther and Launov, 2011). That
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is, they are pulled into self-employment to take advantage of kin specific character-
istics which can provide informal means of increasing income even in the absence of
discrimination in the formal sector. Hence, the informal sector can provide a compara-
tive advantage for workers who wouldn’t be better off in the formal sector (Clark and
Drinkwater, 2000).
Minority Enclaves: By developing in an ethnic labour market, minority members can
avoid direct competition from members from dominant group. Minority groups may be
able to mobilize resources and produce opportunities that would have been denied to
them in the broader formal labour market. Moreover, the clustering of members of an
ethnic group is an important pull factor to enter self-employment, as it can increase
entrepreneurial opportunities by providing a self-supporting economic environment with
access to informal credit and labour through family ties. This phenomenon is known
as the Enclave Effect. Enclaves are defined as a cluster of individuals from an ethnic
group who reside within the same geographical location, for example, a neighbourhood,
a village or a community. While living in enclaves can exclude minorities from equal
access to opportunities and rewards, it might provide protection from discrimination
generated by competition.
The idea of ethnic enclaves was first introduced by Portes and Wilson in the context of
the USA (Wilson, 1980). They argue that immigrants who enter the US labour market
are discriminated against because they are distinct from the mainstream. Often, they
reside in geographical clusters. If immigrants have the necessary human capital, they
build their own self-employed ventures which are a part of an “ethnic labour market”.
Portes and Jensen argue that Ethnic enclaves provide positive rewards to their members
and argue that ethnic entrepreneurship is an unorthodox, but important avenue for so-
cial mobility of ethnic minorities and can suggest alternative policies for those still mired
in poverty (Portes and Jensen, 1992). Thus, clusters of immigrant entrepreneurs can
actually generate the characteristics of the primary labour market. These entrepreneurs
also prefer to hire individuals from their own ethnic group, thus creating a social and
labour network, which interacts as a group with the outside market. In so doing, the
enclave has the solidarity and protection of numbers, and helps its members to circum-
vent discrimination. It also skirts competition from the mainstream and majority (Das,
2006). The role of ethnicity in labour markets has been empirically tested for several
developed and developing countries; Semyonov for Israel, Evans for Australia, Clark
and Drinkwater for UK, and Das for India. All found the existence of ethnic enclaves
in their respective country settings (Semyonov, 1988) (Das, 2006) (Evans, 1989) (Clark
and Drinkwater, 1998).
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Previous research on discrimination in the Ghanaian formal sector : Existing literature
on Ghana has given mixed results; Barr and Oduro find no evidence of discrimination
in hiring and payment in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector, however, the Northerners
are paid less due to less productivity (Barr and Oduro, 2000). In contrast, Collier
and Garg find that in the public sector, dominant ethnic groups receive wage premium
which is not due to productive characteristics. Collier and Garg discuss that it is a
common feature of African societies that individuals belong to kin-groups which impose
reciprocated obligations. However, these practices differ in a multi-segmented economy,
for example, in the traditional small scale sector, kin groups can act as insurance and
transfer institutions which succeed in lowering transaction costs. However, in the formal
employment sector where large scale production takes place, firms employ multiple kin
groups. Kin group preference is thus curtailed in the formal sector due to management
practices and competition. ’Kin groups can have different economic effects depending
upon the sector in which they are located. In the small scale sector production is
organised on an intra-kin group basis. The kin group lowers transactions costs compared
with atomistic behaviour. Whereas in the large scale sector production is organized on
an inter-kin group basis. The patronage which kin groups seek to enforce is restrained
by organizational innovations not found in non-kin groups societies (Collier, 1999b)’.
They test for kin group favouritism in the public and private sector only. For the
private sector, they find no evidence of kin group preference in wages and conclude that
workers are paid according to human capital attributes. However, in the public sector,
there is some evidence of wage premium for the dominant ethnic group. Barr and
Oduro investigate the effects of ethnic identity and ethnic boundaries on labour market
outcomes in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector and find large differentials between
ethnic groups, specifically Northerners. They look at earnings differentials between
members of different ethnic groups and employers’ relatives, unrelated co-ethnics, and
other workers and do not find any evidence of statistical discrimination. Most of the
differential is explained by observed worker characteristics, in particular education and
family background, which vary across ethnic groups. However, there is preferential
treatment given to co-ethnics in hiring, suggesting that kinship networks are playing an
important role in Ghanaian labour market (Barr and Oduro, 2000).
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4.3 The Setting: Ghana
This section relies heavily on research by the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human
Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) on West African economies titled Horizontal Inequalities
in Nigeria, Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire (Langer et al., 2007).
Ghana, like most countries in Africa is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural
society. Its current population, which is estimated at about twenty million, is a vast
mosaic of large and small ethnic groups. It is estimated that there are about ninety-two
separate ethnic groups in Ghana. These groups are often classified into a few large
groups, namely, Akan, Mole Dagbani, Ewe, Ga Adangbe, Guan, and Gurma. According
to the 2000 census, the predominant group is the Akan (49.1 percent), followed by
the Mole Dagbani (16.5 percent), then the Ewe with (12.7 percent), the Ga Adangbe
(8.0 percent), the Guan (4.4 percent), the Gurma (3.9 percent), the Grusi with (2.8
percent), the Mande–Busanga (1.1 percent) and then others (1.5 percent) members of
the population (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) 2000). Moreover, Ghana’s ethnic map
is almost coterminous with its religious map. Christians (69 percent) are predominantly
Akan are found largely in the southern sections while Muslims (16 percent) live mainly
in the Northern section. Traditional religions are evenly distributed among the various
ethnic groups throughout the country (GSS, 2000). The spatial distribution of the two
major foreign religions, Islam and Christianity, almost coincides with the division of the
country into the northern half which is poor and disadvantaged, and the southern half
which is wealthy and more developed.
Socio-Economic Inequalities in Ghana: Like most West African countries that have
the Gulf of Guinea as a southern border, Ghana shows a developmental disparity between
the North and South regions. This disparity arose due to a combination of circumstances
and policies. The current inequalities and ethnic tensions are contributed to the ethnic
rivalries during the colonial era and the effect of colonialism on different groups and
regions of the country, coupled with the uneven distribution of social and economic
resources in both the colonial and post independence Ghana and geography. The British
colonial policy of investing more heavily in those regions where exploitable resources,
such as gold, diamonds, timber, and cocoa, were available or readily produced and
cheapest to export. Also, the geographical concentration of most agricultural activities
and resources, particularly tree crops such as cocoa, as well as natural resources, notably
minerals and forest resources, in the Southern regions (Langer et al., 2007).
Dominance of the Akan: Even though no part of Ghana is ethnically homogeneous,
a main feature of the county’s ethnic polarization is the north–south divide and the
dominance of the southern half of Ghana in general, and in particular by the Akan group,
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who have relative economic and political dominance over other groups. The southern
regions of the Greater Accra, Eastern and Western, Central and Ashanti Regions are
predominantly ethnically and linguistically Akan. These areas have a higher index of
development than the Northern and Upper Regions which are ethnically non-Ewe and
non- For example, the index of development of the Northern (0.11) and Upper Regions
(0.071) are far below the indices of the other Akan regions, from 0.265 and higher. In
addition, of the five regions classified as poor in Ghana in 1999, poverty levels are highest
in the Northern Regions (Langer et al., 2007).
Affirmative Action in Ghana: In order to redress ethnic inequalities in economic and
political fields, post-independent regimes have adopted various affirmative action policies
and programmes1. The policies range from the distribution of government-controlled re-
sources, staffing of the public bureaucracy, key appointive positions in government and
the public sector, distribution of symbolic goods, coupled with the centralization of po-
litical power. The problem of inequality has also been partially addressed through repre-
sentation and appointments of individuals from a variety of ethno-regional and religious
backgrounds to prominent positions in the government and state services. Research has
shown that at least in the metropolitan areas of Accra region, institutional structures
as well as distribution of symbolic and bureaucratic resources that promote inclusion
and participation have helped to check ethnic polarization in the society (Langer et al.,
2007).
How Ghana compares with neighbouring economies: The North-South divide
in Ghana is not peculiar to Ghana alone. It can be found almost in every coastal West
African country. For instance in Nigeria, CRISE studies have found evidence of persisting
economic, political, social, and cultural inequalities. The core poverty is twice as high in
the Northwest of the country as in the Southeast. Some of the economic inequalities can
be traced to discriminatory allocation of government projects and grants, and differential
access to key sectors of the economy, such as oil and gas, and telecommunications. Many
CRISE studies show the existence of inequalities and discriminatory practices based on
ethnic divide and religion. These studies found evidence of discrimination in terms of job
opportunities, conditions of work, educational opportunities and in preference in places
residence. Affirmative action programmes like the Federal Character Principle and the
Federal Character Commission are currently managing these inequalities. However,
these programs have not been able to ensure the adequate representation of small ethnic
minority groups in mixed ethnic states (Langer et al., 2007).
Like Ghana and Nigeria, Coˆte d’Ivoire is also confronted by a serious socioeconomic
North-South divide. Once more, the origins of this socio-economic North-South divide
1Ghana Human Development Report 1997
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are diverse and relate to such factors as ecological and climatic differences, the differ-
ential impact of colonial policies and post colonial economic development policies. The
developmental North-South divide is also likely to have increased significantly due to
the civil war. Moreover, in the rebel-controlled Northern regions, government services
in the educational and health spheres are no longer provided at all or are at least badly
affected due to the conflict. Only recently a small number of schools and some other
government services have been opened up again.
4.4 Data and Methodology
The data used in this study is from the fifth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey
2005 (GLSS-5). The GLSS-5 covers 8,687 households in 580 enumeration areas and, is
representative at the national and regional level. It has a special focus on employment,
labour force characteristics, and employment income, making it particularly suitable for
the current study. Only individual fifteen years of age and older - who reported that
they were employed during the past seven days were included in the analysis.
Data on employment earnings and types of employment feature prominently in the
current study and merit additional attention. Average monthly earnings were used as
the measure of employment earnings, defined as total weekly income from employment
multiplied by 4.33. The GLSS 5 allows for multiple estimates of self-employment income.
However, the reliability of income estimates derived from reported gross revenues less
operating expenses are questionable. Instead, direct reported net earnings from a given
self-employment activity is used (Heintz and Slonimczyk, 2007).
The indicators for type of employment used in this study classified employment along
three dimensions: employment status (waged employment or self-employment), formal-
ity of the employment activity (formal or informal), and sector (public v. private). Indi-
viduals were classified based on their primary job. The methods chosen for differentiating
informal employment from formal employment were adapted from the recommendations
of the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, which suggested that the
definition of informal employment should include both (1) employment in informal en-
terprises (including all forms of self-employment) and (2) wage employment in informal
jobs outside of informal enterprises. Self-employed individuals were considered to be
operating informally if their enterprise was not registered with any government agency.
Wage workers were considered to be working informally if they did not have any kind
of employment contract (Hussman, 2004).
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Table 4.1 describes the variables used in the earnings regressions. The major indepen-
dent variables used are education in levels specification, marital status, age, experience,
regional dummies, main occupation, household characteristics and ethnicity. Table 4.2
shows summary statistics of labour force by each region and the main ethnic and reli-
gious groups. The sample of 10,080 earners is divided into three types of employment;
paid employees, informal sector employees and enterprise owners. The labour force is
dominated by self-employment either as farmers or in the non-agricultural sector. About
forty percent of the paid jobs are concentrated in the capital region, Accra. Fifty per-
cent are scattered in the six Southern regions and only ten percent in the three Northern
regions. Moreover, the paid employment sector is dominated by the Akan groups with
fifty percent of the jobs in the formal sector. Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics
separately for the dominant and non-dominant groups. In the full sample, it can be
seen that the dominant group has higher earnings and higher education than the non-
dominant groups. However, in the paid sector, the non-dominant Ewe group seems to be
receiving a wage premium. The education level is roughly comparable for all groups in
paid employment. Turning to the self employment sector, the earnings are significantly
lower than the paid sector and the education level is also lower than in paid work.
Model Specification:
This section outlines the empirical model of the factors which determine individuals’
choice of employment sector and extent of variations in earnings for each ethnic group.
Determinants of employment type are estimated by using the binary probit model. The
discrete dependent variable is estimated as a probability; in this context employment
type is the discrete dependent variable, which takes on a value of 1 if a person is in
employment type, e.g. paid, self or informal employment and zero otherwise. This
probability of being in self-employment/formal employment is regressed with several
covariates in the model gathered in a vector X :
P [Employment = 1] = F (Xβ) and P [Employment = 0] = 1− F (Xβ)
where β measures the effect of changes in the independent variables on the probability
of individual is employed in the formal/informal sector. The major independent vari-
ables used are region of residence, education (specified in levels) , marital status, age,
experience, household characteristics and ethnicity. The probit model for full sample for
sectors of employment is presented below:
General Specification: Sector of Employment Probit
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P [Sector of Employmentih] = α1 + (Level of education)ih β1 +
(Individual characteristics)ih β2 + (Urban)ih β3 + (Region dummies)ih β4 +
(Household characteristics)ih β5 + (Occupation dummies)ih β6 +
(Ethnicity dummy)ih β7 + (Ethnicity ∗Region interaction)ih β8 + ξih
Where P [Sector of Employment] equals 1 if participating in type of work and 0 if not.
Level of Education are the education dummies for primary, secondary, sixth form, and
tertiary education. Urban equals 1 if lives in an urban area and 0 if belongs to rural area.
Region dummies equal 1 if from the North, South or Accra region. Ethnicity dummies
equal 1 if belongs to Akan, Ewe or Mole Dagbani groups. Ethnicity*Region interaction
equals 1 if belongs to ethnicity e from region r. ξih Individual-specific error or random
component.
General Specification, Mincerian Earnings Function:
The standard Mincerian approach is adopted for the estimation of earning function in
different sectors of employment.
(Log − Income)ih = α1 + (Education dummies)ih β1 +
(Individual characteristics)ih β2 + (urban)ih β3 + (Region dummies)ih β4 +
(Household characteristics)ih β5 + (Occupation dummies)ih β6 +
(Ethnicity dummies)ih β7 + (Ethnicity ∗Region interaction)ih β8 + ξih
where (Log − Income) is the log of earnings (wages or income) for individual i. Level
of Education are the dummies for completed primary, secondary, sixth form, or tertiary
education. Individual characteristics is a vector of observed characteristics of individual
i. Household characteristics is a vector of observed characteristics of the household
Urban equals 1 if lives in an urban area and 0 if belongs to rural area. Region dummies
is a dummy if from the North, South, Accra regions Ethnicity dummies is a dummy if
belongs to Akan, Ewe or Mole Dagbani groups Ethnicity*Region interaction equals 1 if
belongs to ethnicity e from region r. ξih Individual-specific error or random component.
The major independent variables used in this study are standard for estimating employ-
ment probabilities and earning equations in the existing literature (Barr and Oduro,
2000) (Das, 2006) (Heintz and Slonimczyk, 2007) (Clark and Drinkwater, 2000) (Col-
lier, 1999b). Theoretically, the education has a positive relationship with employment in
the formal sector of the labour market i.e. the higher the education level of a worker, the
more likely it is that he/she will be employed in the formal sector. As for the marriage
variable, it is expected to be inversely proportional to participation rates of women,
while positively proportional to those of men. Previous research shows that earnings in
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the informal sector in the rural areas are lower than that of urban areas (Heintz and
Slonimczyk, 2007). However, self employment rates are expected to be higher in urban
areas due to structure of opportunities and the absence of farm related work (Das, 2006).
The household size is also considered to affect participation in both paid and self em-
ployment, especially for women. One reason, among other factors, why women may have
lower earnings is that they are disproportionately responsible for unpaid, non-market
activities such as household chores and taking care of young children. Because women
must take responsibility for these non-remunerative activities, their ability to obtain and
keep employment is reduced thereby causing lower earnings even after controlling for ed-
ucation, type of employment, and similar factors. Thus, one would expect a negative
estimate for the household size and number of children variables, if the responsibil-
ity for childcare argument were the primary determinant or women’s disadvantage in
the Ghanaian labour market (Hertz and Winters, 2008). Also, the ‘female’ indicator
is expected to be to either become insignificant or, at least, have an effect of smaller
magnitude once the presence of a child is controlled for.
Since the focus of this paper is on effects of ethnicity on labour market outcomes in
Ghana, my main interest is in the effect of ethnicity variables and their interactions in
the discussion of results. The sign and significance of β8 in the earnings equation tells
us whether a particular group has an earnings advantage when compared to another
excluded group. In order to account for geographical differences in earnings among
ethnic groups, region dummies are interacted with the ethnicity dummies. That is, to
investigate whether returns associated with region vary across ethnicity, an interaction
term for ethnicity and region is added to the model. For example, if the Mole Dagbani-
Accra interaction term in the paid employment earnings regression turns out to be
negative, then it can be concluded that Mole Dagbani have an earnings disadvantage in
the Accra region when employed in the formal sector. Lastly, i is the individual-specific
error.
I started by estimating OLS models of earnings functions on the dominant ethnic group
Akan, and non-dominant Non-Akan wage earners to provide some baseline results. How-
ever, naive OLS estimates of earnings functions potentially suffer from sample selectivity
and will not be reliable unless such biases are removed. The sample selection bias (SSB)
occurs in the OLS estimates when the variable of interest is only observed for a selected
non-random sample of the population of interest. Specifically, when observations are
selected in a process that is not independent of the outcome of interest, selection effects
may lead to biased inferences regarding a variety of labour market outcomes. In the
context of this study, it is not observed whether the informal sector is voluntarily chosen
by individuals as an employment opportunity or if individuals are pushed into informal
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employment because of entry barriers into the formal sector. Moreover, wages are ob-
served only for individuals participating in the paid labour force. Most studies focus
on waged workers, whereas many individuals in developing countries are self-employed
rather than in waged work and have income from owned businesses rather than paid
wages. Consequently, the estimates of the earning function will be biased as the sample
of paid employed, as well as the self-employed are a potentially non-random draw from
the population.
Heckman’s correction for sample selectivity is used to correct of SSB. This entails esti-
mating the employment participation equation, and the predicted probabilities of em-
ployment participation from this equation are used to derive the selectivity term λ ,
which is then included in the main earnings function2. To identify λ, the employment
participation equation must include exclusion restrictions that are not part of the vectors
in the Mincerian earnings equation. The key challenge is finding suitable instruments
that have an impact on sector of employment but are not part of the individual charac-
teristics vector in earning equation.
There are a number of factors, both observable and unobservable, which influence the
choice of sector of employment. The specification in the Heckman selection equation
used in this study has been guided by Rees and Shah, Collier and Garg, and Clark and
Drinkwater (Clark and Drinkwater, 1998) (Collier, 1999b) (Rees and Shah, 1986). The
selection equation contains all standard variables from the earnings equations and some
additional instrumental variables, which are discussed below:
For Formal Sector: Family background indicators such as father’s employment in the
public sector could have a positive influence on the propensity to be in formal paid
work. Father’s work may reflect endogeneity of preference and even nepotism in the for-
mal sector. Also, differences in paid-employment rates could be driven by factors such
as father’s education and mother’s education. Family background variables constitute
valid instruments if they affect sector choice through their effect on schooling or inter
generational transmission of ability. Family background can be a proxy omitted abil-
ity, school quality, and out-of-school learning environment or reflects nepotistic family
connections3 (Heckman and Hotz, 1989).
For Self Employment Sector: The number of children in household and access to credit
can have a positive impact on the propensity to be in non-farm self employment. Kids
in household can affect the probability to be in self employment, it may have a positive
or negative influence on the propensity to enter self-employment. Children may provide
2Only father’s education and father’s paid employment are used here. Mother’s education could not
be used due to data limitations
3See Appendix for a detailed derivation of the Heckman model.
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a source of informal (and possibly low-paid but trusted) labour in a family business.
Alternatively, the presence of children may induce risk-averse individuals to choose paid-
employment over the relatively less certain rewards of self-employment. Family workers
may provide cheap and reliable source of labour. Moreover, access to credit can also
increase the propensity to be self employed. Members of ethnic groups can have access
to informal sources of finance through social networks. Specifically, dummy variables
indicating whether the individual has successfully obtained a business loan was used. If
credit rationing and imperfect access to credit were responsible for observed differences
in propensity to be in self employment, it is expected these variables to pick up the effect
(Clark and Drinkwater, 1998).
4.5 Discussion Of Estimation Results
In this section, estimation results for Heckman selection model and results for the test
of the Enclave Hypothesis are presented. In the presence of preferential treatment for
dominant group in hiring and wages, the expected result for the paid sector Heckman
earnings model would have a positive and significant coefficient for the dominant group
only. Conversely, in a competitive market, the earnings of employees would reflect
only their productivity. Hence, the earnings and selection equation is expected to be
insignificant. This is only the case if the model is correctly specified. If there are omitted
variable which effect wages and are correlated to ethnicity, then there will be a positive
effect for the dominant group, even with perfect competition. The expected outcomes
for paid employment sector are summarised in the table below:
Expected results - paid work Dominant Non-dominant
Perfect competition ∼ ∼
Preference for dominant Positive ∼
Next, if enclaves provide better labour market outcomes for ethnic minorities and also
increase the likelihood of having a lucrative business, the expected result would be
a positive coefficient for the non-dominant group in a region who are concentrated a
particular community. The expected outcomes for non-farm self employment sector are
summarised in the table below:
Expected results - self emp Dominant Non-dominant
Enclave effect ∼ Positive
No enclave effect ∼ ∼
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Selection Corrected Earning Function Paid Employment: Table 4.5 displays parameter
estimates from the GLSS5 for Ghana in the paid employment sector. The selection
equations control for membership of the ethnic groups of Ghana. Potentially, member-
ship of the dominant ethnic group gives rise to a wage premium because of preferential
recruitment to high wage jobs as well as to preferential promotion once recruited. As
shown in the summary statistics, the formal sector pays higher wages than the informal
sector, so co-ethnic preference at the recruitment stage would be revealed in the sector
choice probit.
Selection probit equations that control for sample selection bias in the earnings equation
are considered first. The selection equations exhibit standard features with positive
effects of urban region and education; propensity to be in paid employment increases if
individual is a single male who is living in urban region and has higher education and
experience. The LAMBDA term is large and statistically significantly negative for the
paid employment regressions.
For determining sector choice in paid employment, identification instruments are adopted
from Collier and Garg (Collier, 1999b). Father’s education and a variable indicating
whether father worked in formal sector can provide identification as this many reflect
family background, endogeneity of preference or even nepotism. Differences in paid-
employment rates may be perpetuated through the inter-generational transmission of
paid-employment propensities. It could also be driven by family background, variables
such as father’s education. Family background variables constitute valid instruments if
they affect sector choice through their effect on schooling or inter generational transmis-
sion of ability as it proxies omitted ability, education quality, and out-of-school learning
environment or reflects nepotistic family connections4(Heckman and Hotz, 1989). The
estimation shows that father’s education increases propensity to be in paid employ-
ment while father in paid work has no effect. These estimates point towards absence of
nepotism in the formal sector in Ghana where only human capital is rewarded.
Having controlled for selection in paid employment, I now test the effects of minority
status on earnings in the formal sector of Ghana. The earnings equation for the paid
sector shows positive returns for working in Accra, having work experience and being
married. However, higher education seems to have no impact on earnings in the paid
employment sector. Education affects occupation outcomes but not earnings within
occupation. This finding is consistent with previous research on Ghana, others also find
mixed evidence regarding returns to education in Ghana (Heintz and Slonimczyk, 2007)
4See Methodology section for a formal discussion of these instruments.
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(Sackey, 2004) (Teal, 2001). The occupation variables have expected signs; public sector
workers with contractual criterion of formality have a significant effect on earnings 5.
Since the principal focus of the paper is the affect of ethnicity on employment, I will
now focus on the ethnicity indicators. I find no reliable evidence of hiring or earning
disadvantages for ethnic minorities. One striking result from the earnings equation is
that the non-dominant group Mole Dagbani is more likely to be in paid employment
when compared to excluded group, Akan. However, Mole Dagbani receive an earning
disadvantage of twenty percentage points, primarily due to their low level of education.
This differential remains after controlling for observed personal characteristics. However,
this result is only significant at 10 percent, so this result should be interpreted with
caution. The results for Ewe groups are similar to those of Mole Dagbani group. They
are more likely to be in self employment when compared to the excluded group but
do not receive a wage premium in the paid sector employment. Hence, there is no
conclusive evidence about favouritism in Ghana; the paid employment sector of Ghana
does not reward membership of dominant group. Turning to the interaction term which
estimates the difference in difference for being an ethnic group in paid employment in
the Accra region, the selection probit would reveal any preferential treatment given to
the dominant Akan group. The interaction terms for both non-dominant groups are
insignificant which points towards absence of preferential treatment in the public sector
in the Accra region. This may be due to hiring rules and quotas which prevent over-
representation of any ethnic group within the formal sector (Collier, 1999b). Either
pressure for co-ethnics preference is not a feature of Ghanaian organizations or that
pressure is successfully restrained within the paid sector. Looking at the interaction
terms for the Northern region, the Mole Dagbani group is less likely to be in paid
employment when in the Northern region. This is likely due to the disproportionate
distribution of the paid sector in Ghana. Very few of the paid individuals are found in
the Northern regions.
The explanation for the main findings from the paid employment sector is that the
Ghanaian formal sector operates under the support of accepted rules and regulations
which are enacted and implemented by the government (Addai, 2011). However, only
those living in metropolitan areas have access to these well-paying formal sector jobs.
Selection corrected earning function for Self employment: Table 4.6 reports the estimates
for the propensity to be in self employment. The probit estimates for those in self-
employment exhibit standard features6 with positive effect of industry of employment,
5The regressions also control for education level, experience, and occupation type. The coefficients
on these variables are secondary to the analysis and are not reported in the table.
6The coefficients on these variables are secondary to the analysis and are not reported in the table.
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location7 , gender8 while negative impact of higher education9.
For determining sector choice in self employment, identification instruments are adopted
from Rees and Shah, Clark and Drinkwater, and Collier and Garg (Clark and Drinkwa-
ter, 1998) (Collier, 1999b) (Rees and Shah, 1986). The identification instruments all
turn out to be positive and highly significant; the number of children in household and
access to credit can have a positive impact on the propensity to be in non-farm self em-
ployment, as family workers may provide cheap and reliable source of labour. As for the
second instrument of access to credit, households that have taken out a loan for business
purpose have higher propensity to be in self employment. However, Susu microfinance
accounts have a puzzling outcome10. Land ownership also increase propensity to be in
non-farm self employment. Household land can provide a rent-free site for setting up a
home business which can significantly reduce production costs.
When compared to the excluded dominant group Akan, the other non-dominant groups
are more likely to be in non-farm self-employment. After controlling for selection in
non-farm self employment, I now look at earnings in self employment. Returns to self
employment are increasing if the business is located in an urban area and if owner has
education and experience in the business. There is also a significantly positive effect
on earnings if the enterprise owner keeps account of the profits in the business, hinting
towards the size and quality of the enterprise. However, age of the individual has a
negative impact on earnings in self-employment11.
Next, judging from the interaction terms for Mole Dagbani and Ewe in Accra and
Northern region, the Ewe group have highest returns in self employment in both Accra
and Northern region. On the other hand, the Mole Dagbani, a non-dominant group in
the Accra region, is disadvantaged in the Accra when in self-employment.
The Enclave Effect: The final aim in this section is to test for the existence of ethnic
enclaves in Ghana and estimate the effect of living in an enclave on economic out-
comes. If enclaves are important for ethnic minorities, then it might be expected that
7Living in an urban area also increases propensity to be in non-farm self employment as the rural
areas are mostly home to farmers and other agricultural unpaid workers.
8Women are more likely to be in non-farm self employment than being in paid work. This points
towards the gender wage gap in the formal sector; Ghanaian women prefer being self employed than
accepting low paying jobs in the formal sector(Addai, 2011) (Hertz and Winters, 2008)
9The propensity to be in non-farm self employment goes from positive to negative when education
level increases from primary to tertiary. This is intuitive as those with tertiary education will find it
easier to get formal sector paid employment.
10Having a Susu account decreases the propensity to be in self-employment.
11This is a counter-intuitive but the earning function in self employment might not necessarily exhibit
the same features as that in paid employment. Consider age, older workers are considered more experi-
enced so they are paid accordingly in paid employment. However, the non-farm self employment sample
is of business owners whose earnings are profits from the business. Tthe argument of age and experience
is less convincing when applied to self employment.
Chapter 4. Minority Status & Income Determination in Ghana. 83
concentration of an ethnic group in an area can increase their propensity to be in self
employment, as the existence of clusters of members of an ethnic group can increase
entrepreneurial opportunities by providing a self-supporting economic environment with
access to informal credit and labour through family ties.
The GLSS 5 has information on communities (enumeration areas) within each region
with information about the ethnic composition and population of the area. For the
estimation of the enclave effect, the selection model is augmented with a variable that
measures the concentration of an ethnic group in an enumeration area. For example, a
Mole Dagbani community in the Southern region would be an enumeration area where
this group is reported as the major ethnic group.
If ethnic enclaves increase the chances of non-farm self employment, a positive and
significant coefficient should be observed for the minority enclave indicator. In table 4.7
12, presents the results for the augmented self-employment Heckman equations. Judging
from change in significance of the variables of interest, it can be concluded that the
previous self-employment regression had an omitted variable bias. The Northern region
indicator, which was previously insignificant, is now positive and highly significant.
This makes better intuitive sense as this region has less opportunities of waged work.
Therefore, more individuals would prefer non-farm self employment to informal farm
work. Also, the interaction terms for both included groups with regions have also become
insignificant, indicating that the previous results from the self-employment regressions
are unreliable. The remaining controls have similar features to the self-employment
equation. The identification instruments remain positive and highly significant.
Turning to the minority enclave effect, sixteen minority community dummies (eight for
Ewe and eight for Mole Dagbani) in regions where the ethnic group is in minority were
added to the regression. It is observed that only Ewe communities seem to benefit from
residing in enclaves; four out of the eight Ewe communities have significant results for
the self-employment propensities whereas only two Mole Dagbani communities come
out with high significance for self employment. As for returns in self-employment, Mole
Dagbani groups are significantly disadvantaged by living in communities. For example,
Mole-Enclave-South5, a Mole Dagbani community in the Southern region, has signif-
icantly decreasing earnings in self-employment. For the Ewe group, earnings seem to
increase with the rise in ethnic concentration in the Northern region. Hence, the results
from this analysis demonstrates that the minority enclave hypothesis does not hold for
Mole Dagbani but it does so for the Ewe groups.
Why might Ewe enclaves be better than Mole Dagbani enclaves? To answer this, further
explore the nature and quality of the enclaves across ethnic groups is required. Table 4.4
12The coefficients on these variables are secondary to the analysis and are not reported in the table.
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gives some indication of the enclave quality for Ewe and Mole Dagbani groups by focusing
on the level of employment in the community. The Ewe enclaves are more economically
advanced than the Mole Dagbani enclaves. The Majority of wage earners in the Mole
Dagbani enclaves are engaged in farm work while Ewe enclaves have higher percentages
of observations in the formal sector of employment, hinting at better economic conditions
of the community.
The main finding from the enclave results are that the Ewes in Ghana are pulled into
self employment where these effects are more pronounced in areas where there are fewer
opportunities for formal work, like the Northern region. They live and operate their
businesses in geographical clusters, in much the same way as Portes and his colleagues
have described the businesses operations of Chinese and other Asians in the US cities
(Portes and Jensen, 1992). Thus for the Ewe groups, it is fairly apparent that minority
enclaves are a reality. However, the Mole Dagbani are unlikely to be in self employment
and are least likely to built minority enclaves. There is no evidence of the ‘push’ factor
for them in the same way as for the Ewe. The Mole Dagbani group lack the means to
form minority enclaves and thus they crowd into casual labour, as shown in the enclave
quality estimates.
4.6 In Conclusion
This paper uses the Ghana Living Standards Survey 2005 to empirically analyse the
employment outcomes of ethnic minorities in Ghanaian labour market.
Like in most developing economies, the formal sector in Ghana forms only small part
of the labour market and concentrated in the capital region, Accra. It is possible that
the limited options in paid work create a tendency of preferential treatment being given
to the dominant groups in the population. There is no concrete evidence to support
the existence of preferential treatment for the dominant group. Contrary to what was
expected, the non-dominant group, Mole Dagbani, are more likely to be in paid sector
in the capital region of Accra. This evidence of reverse discrimination in paid formal
sector is a striking finding. Plausible explanation here is that the public sector is well
regulated and hiring rules and quotas which prevent over-representation of any ethnic
group within the formal sector (Collier, 1999b).
In the to less-developed regions outside the metropolitan areas, the absence of paid work
opportunities has resulted in ethnic groups entering the informal sector , with the effect
of creating create characteristics of primary labour market in terms of earnings. Non-
dominant groups Mole Dagbani in Southern regions and Ewe in the Northern regions
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are pulled into non-farm self employment where access to credit and family workers are
important determinants of entry into entrepreneurship. One important pull factor for
ethnic minorities into self employment is the geographical concentration of co-ethnics,
an enclave. Self employment outcomes are even better if non-dominant group is in an
enclave where members form a network which raises opportunity of gainful trade. The
Enclave Effect holds for the Ewe groups where the self employment outcomes are higher
if Ewe members live in an enclave rather than being dispersed across the region.
More research is needed to identify the factors behind patterns of ethnicity in the labour
markets in Ghana and to develop appropriate policy responses. As mentioned earlier,
other studies of employment in Ghana suggest that social capital (e.g. kinship net-
works and information networks) may be important in determining wage differentials
and access to formal employment opportunities (Barr and Oduro, 2000) (Collier, 1999b).
The analysis presented here suggests that improved access to education should help to
improve outcomes in the formal labour market among Ghanaians.
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Table 4.1: Variable in selection equation and wage equation, and their coding.
Variable Description and coding
Type of employment Participation during last week equals 1 if participated 0 otherwise
Types:
Formal sector paid work
Informal sector paid work
Non-farm Self Employment
Age, Age2 Age in years
Age squared as continuous variable
Marital status Single Equals 1 if single, 0 otherwise
Log-wage Natural log of monthly wages in Cedi
Log-income Natural log of monthly earnings in Cedi
Education,6 dummies No education (reference)
Primary, Equals 1 if completed Primary education
Middle, Equals 1 if completed Middle education
Secondary, Equals 1 if completed Secondary education
Sixth Form, Equals 1 if completed Sixthform education
Tertiary, Equals 1 if completed Tertiary education
Region, 3 Dummies North
South
Accra
Household size Number of individuals in the household
Kids in household Number of children in the household aged 14 or younger
Urban Equals 1 if belongs to urban region
Occupation 5 Dummies for Formal employment
4 Dummies for Informal employment
Enclave variable Dummies for enclaves in each region
Ethnicity, 3 dummies Akan
Ewe
Mole Dagbani
Religion, 2 dummies Christian
Non-Christian
Some workers Dummy, if enterprise has employees
Father yrs edu Years of education completed by father
Father’s work Father employed in the public sector
Business loan Dummy, whether taken out a loan for business
SUSU Microfinance Dummy, whether taking part in Susu
Own Land Dummy, whether family owns some land
Lambda Selectivity term
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Table 4.2: Composition of the labour force by region and ethnicity
Type Formal Informal Enterprise
(a) Region Percent (n.) Percent (n.) Percent (n.) Total LF (N.)
South 51.28 59.03 56.1 56.67
(764) (2604) (2345) (5713)
Accra 37.79 19.97 25.86 25.05
(563) (881) (1081) (2525)
North 10.94 20.99 18.04 18.28
(163) (926) (754) (1843)
Total 100 100 100 100
(1490) (4410) (4180) (10080)
(b) Ethnic group Percent (n.) Percent (n.) Percent (n.) Total LF (N.)
Akan 49.73 45.53 47.11 46.81
(741) (2008) (1969) (4718)
Ewe 26.78 20.39 23.01 22.42
(399) (899) (962) (2260)
Mole Dagbani 23.49 34.08 29.88 30.77
(350) (1503) (1249) (3102)
Total 100 100 100 100
(1490) (4410) (4180) (10080)
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of various groups of earners
Full Sample Akan Ewe Mole
Weekly Wages (Cedi) 248,315 244,359 165,904
No Edu 16.77 21.28 60.2
Primary 14.79 17.83 12.79
Secondary 56.99 48.81 21.62
sixth-form 0.7 1.24 0.32
tertiary 5.81 5.75 2.19
technical 4.94 5.09 2.87
Paid employment
Weekly Wages (Cedi) 341,142 597,345 354,263
No Edu 1.75 1.25 18.29
Primary 3.64 3.26 6.29
Secondary 52.5 50.88 40.57
sixth-form 1.89 5.01 1.71
tertiary 20.78 19.55 13.14
technical 19.43 20.05 20
Self Empolyment
Weekly Income (Cedi) 290076 205059 187408
No Edu 13.95 24.43 60.3
Primary 16.16 22.47 14.66
Secondary 61.63 46.39 21.87
sixth-form 0.6 0.62 0.16
tertiary 4.98 3.4 1.51
technical 2.67 2.68 1.51
Table 4.4: Quality of ethnic enclaves
Enclave Quality Ewe South 1 Ewe South 3 Mole South 1 Mole South 3
Paid employed 36.67 6.45 24.14 2.94
Self employed 36.67 39.52 17.24 2.94
Farm work 26.67 54.05 58.63 94.12
Total l00 100 100 100
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Table 4.5: Heckman selection wage regression for paid employment
Heckman model Wage Equation Selection Equation
Log of Wages Paid employment
Mole Dagbani -0.201* 0.305***
(-0.122) (0.074)
Ewe -0.12 0.171***
(0.081) (0.056)
Accra 0.165** -0.0108
(0.068) (0.056)
North -0.528 0.737**
(0.352) (0.301)
Ewe*Accra 0.094 0.067
(0.200) (0.155)
Mole Dagbani*Accra 0.239* 0.0102
(0.145) (0.114)
Ewe*North 0.472 0.737
(0.549) (0.467)
Mole Dagbani*North 0.421 -0.788**
(0.377) (0.313)
Urban -0.152 0.576***
(0.170) (0.043)
Female 0.0995 -0.704***
(0.213) (0.086)
Household Head 0.0989 0.00635
(0.099) (0.080)
Female household Head 0.109 0.0322
(0.139) (0.105)
Age -0.002 0.00243
(0.003) (0.002)
Single -0.348*** 0.353***
(0.117) (0.060)
Education dummies Yes Yes
Experience dummies Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes
Father education 0.0827*
(0.044)
Father Work 0.0596
(0.062)
Lambda -0.759**
(0.376)
Constant 13.17*** -2.194***
(0.917) (0.141)
Observations 9,800 9,800
Censored obs 8341 8341
Uncensored obs 1459 1459
Wald chi2(28) = 225.32 Prob.chi2 = 0.0000
Notes: p-values reported in parentheses
Excluded groups are Akan, Southern region, No education
Lambda is the selection correction term for paid employment
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Table 4.6: Heckman selection wage regression for self employment
Heckman model Income Equation Selection Equation
Log of Income Enterprise owner
Mole dagbani 0.035 -0.009
(0.0745) (0.0544)
Ewe -0.182*** 0.147***
(0.064) (0.0472)
Accra 0.226*** -0.079
(0.065) (0.0489)
North -0.269 0.343
(0.312) (0.250)
Ewe*Accra 0.558*** -0.331***
(0.180) (0.125)
Mole Dagbani*Accra -0.314** 0.267***
(0.130) (0.096)
Ewe*North 1.966*** 0.436
(0.376) (0.326)
Mole Dagbani*North -0.191 0.0106
(0.319) (0.257)
Urban 0.154** 0.410***
(0.060) (0.033)
Female -0.564*** 1.036***
0.180 0.077
Household head 0.213 0.274***
(0.139) (0.076)
Female household head -0.17 -0.167*
(0.145) (0.086)
Age -0.0097*** 0.0064***
(0.002) (0.002)
Single -0.0355 -0.431***
(0.089) (0.051)
Some workers -0.0415
(0.069)
Keep account 0.326***
(0.057)
Own land -0.022 0.179***
(0.047) (0.033)
Susu account owner -0.216*** -0.137***
(0.044) (0.032)
Kids in hh 0.0174**
(0.007)
Business loan 0.516***
(0.048)
Education dummies Yes Yes
Experience dummies Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes
Lambda -0.480***
(0.168)
Constant 12.06*** -1.211***
(0.320) (0.128)
Observations 9,592 9,592
Censored obs 5575 5575
Uncensored obs 4017 4017
Wald chi2(29) = 1082.98 Prob.chi2 = 0.0000
Notes: p-values reported in parentheses
Excluded groups are Akan, Southern region, No education
Lambda is the selection correction term for self employment
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Table 4.7: Testing the Enclave effect for ethnic minorities in Ghana
Heckman model Income Equation Selection Equation
Log of income Enterprise owner
Ewe 0.083 0.0378
(0.129) (0.089)
Mole -0.143 0.0187
(0.129) -0.0834
North -0.629 0.863**
(0.421) (0.384)
Accra 0.0149 0.161
(0.149) (0.101)
Mole*north 0.15 -0.446
(0.428) (0.393)
Ewe*north -0.305 -0.142
(0.752) (0.700)
Mole*centre -0.115 0.171
(0.229) (0.155)
Ewe*centre -0.217 -0.0506
(0.341) (0.203)
Mole-enclave-south1 0.44 -0.386
(0.516) (0.289)
Mole-enclave-south2 -0.188 0.118
(0.346) (0.246)
Mole-enclave-south3 -0.006 -0.279
(0.573) (0.296)
Mole-enclave-south4 -0.301 0.532**
(0.314) (0.237)
Mole-enclave-south5 -0.707** 0.497**
(0.31) (0.236)
Mole-enclave-south6 0.816 1.023*
(0.587) (0.556)
Mole-enclave-south7 1.147 -0.632
(1.205) (0.580)
Mole-enclave-south8 -2.43*** -0.0553
(0.592) (0.439)
Ewe-enclave-south1 -0.43 0.502*
(0.381) (0.267)
Ewe-enclave-south2 0.114 0.379
(0.350) (0.256)
Ewe-enclave-south3 -0.18 0.491***
(0.196) (0.141)
Ewe-enclave-south4 -0.0736 -0.465
(0.528) (0.315)
Ewe-enclave-south5 -0.446 -0.379
(0.554) (0.308)
Ewe-enclave-south6 -0.142 1.250***
(0.772) (0.485)
Ewe-enclave-south7 -0.506*** 0.336***
(0.174) (0.126)
Ewe-enclave-north1 2.640*** 0.324
(0.670) (0.627)
Kids in hh 0.0148*
(0.008)
Business loan 0.575***
(0.066)
Lambda -0.584***
(0.222)
Constant 12.36*** -1.310***
(0.467) (0.177)
Observations 5,454 5,454
Censored Observations 3522 3522
Uncensored observations 1932 1932
Wald chi2(45) = 480.00 Prob chi2 = 0.0000
Notes: p-values reported in parentheses
Excluded groups are Akan, Southern region, No education
Lambda is the selection correction term for self employment
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis contributes to the growing literature on the effects of religion and ethnicity
on education and labour market outcomes of individuals by focusing on the experience
of Pakistan and Ghana.
The first two chapters look at the gender-specific effects of Islamic terrorism on education
and employment rates in north-western Pakistan, by using the difference-in-difference-
in-difference approach. The results presented suggest that the Taliban failed in intim-
idating the public and the effect of their terrorism campaign on female education and
employment was negligible. There is a relatively small effect estimated for girls aged
10-14 during 2007-08, the years of highest-intensity terrorist attacks, followed by a rapid
return to normality after the counterinsurgency measures in 2009. Girls aged 10-14 in
the districts of north-western Pakistan that experienced terrorist incidents between 2007
and 2009 had 10.3 percent lower enrolment rates in the first year of attacks. In the fol-
lowing year, when the Pakistani military retook control over some of the affected areas,
this effect fades away, suggesting that students returned to schools. Moreover, there is
no evidence of dramatic increases in religious school enrolment rates. Enrolment in re-
ligious schools has not seen any increases beyond the 2 percent enrolment rate. Second,
there is no evidence for a substantial drop in the labour force participation rates in the
worst affected districts. Females aged 18 or younger in the districts of north-western
Pakistan that experienced terrorist incidents between 2007 and 2009 had 1.56 percent
lower employment rates in the first year of attacks. In the following year, when the
Pakistani military retook control over some of the affected areas, this effect fades away.
The final paper uses the Ghana Living Standards Survey 2005 to empirically analyse
the employment outcomes of ethnic minorities in Ghanaian labour market. The results
show no evidence to support the existence of preferential treatment for the dominant
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group. The non-dominant group is more likely to be in paid sector in the capital re-
gion. A plausible explanation is that there are hiring rules and quotas which prevent
over-representation of any ethnic group within the formal sector (Collier, 1999b). How-
ever there is some evidence of ethnic enclaves in less developed regions. In the to
less-developed regions outside the metropolitan areas, the absence of paid work oppor-
tunities has resulted in ethnic groups entering the informal sector, where they engage
in lucrative self-employment. Non-dominant groups in Southern regions and Northern
regions are pulled into non-farm self employment. Finally, ethnic enclaves are an im-
portant determinant of entry into entrepreneurship, as there is easy access to credit and
family workers.
Appendix A
Chapter 2
A.1 Robustness Checks
A.1.1 Placebo Tests
In order to ensure that the estimates reflect the impact of terrorism only, a series of
falsification tests known as a placebo test are performed, in which I artificially reassign
the terrorism period to the years 2004 to 2006, each of the 3 years not directly exposed to
terrorism. If the years 2007-08 and 2008-09 heavily experienced terrorism and other years
did not, the expectation is that the high and low intensity districts in unexposed years
should not be affected by terrorism, thus should not yield a decreasing probability of
enrolment in those years. Therefore, confidence in estimates that they reflects the effect
of terrorism would be severely undermined if similar negative estimates are obtained
when terrorism is artificially assigned to years not directly exposed to terrorism.
The difference-in-difference-in-difference was run for a time period in the before years
from 2004 to 2006 to perform a falsification placebo. Two-year treatment period (years
2005-06 and 2006-07) and one-year control period (year 2004-05) were created to conduct
a placebo test, asking whether the false years predict the change in enrolment as well
as the true ones. Table A.1 shows that in the pre-treatment period for the regression of
enrolment for full sample and age groups of 3-9 (primary level), 10-14 (secondary level),
and 15-18 (post-secondary level).
With the exception of the girls aged 15-18 in low intensity districts in year 2005-06,
these false interaction terms are not significant. For the sample of children enrolled in
the age group 15-18, there is a 12 percent decrease in enrolment probability in the year
2005-06 in the low intensity areas, however this is only significant at 10 percent.
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For the year 2006-07, this affect becomes insignificant. For the age group samples, girls
in schooling has a similar outcome. For girls in primary education, there is in fact an
increase in the probability of enrolment in the year 2005-06 of 9 percent. For girls in
post-secondary education, there is a negative probability of enrolment, which is intuitive
as there a very few girls enrolled from that age group. This result confirms that in the
absence of the terrorist attacks, there would have been no negative effect on education,
i.e. drop due to unobserved reasons. These Placebo tests confirm that the initial results
are robust and further support the credibility of the identification strategy of this study.
For remaining regressions of the case studies of Peshawar and Swat, a false treatment
year of 2005-06 is added to the regression, which comes out insignificant (Table A.2).
For the madrassa enrolment, the estimates, though negative, are insignificant (Table
A.3). Hence the placebos support the estimates of the initial results.
A.1.2 Interaction Terms in Probit Models
Empirical economists often estimate interaction terms to infer how the effect of one
independent variable on the dependent variable rely on the magnitude of another in-
dependent variable. Difference-in-difference models, which measure the difference in
outcome over time for the treatment group compared to the difference in outcome over
time for the control group, are examples of models with interaction terms. The mag-
nitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does not equal the marginal effect
of the interaction term, can be of opposite sign, and its statistical significance is not
calculated by standard software (Ai and Norton, 2003).
The interaction effect of a non-linear model, which is often the variable of interest in
empirical studies, cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign, magnitude, or
statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. Instead, the interaction
effect requires computing the cross derivative or cross difference. Like the marginal effect
of a single variable, the magnitude of the interaction effect depends on all the covariates
in the model. In addition, it can have different signs for different observations, making
simple summary measures of the interaction effect difficult (Ai and Norton, 2003).
Linear Probability model:
As a further robustness check for the probit estimates for this paper, I rerun the regres-
sions using the Linear Probability Model instead of the probit using the same variables.
The results for the regressions of enrolment rates (Table A.4) are consistent with the
probit estimates in sign and magnitude of the interaction terms, with a negative effect
on probability of enrolment for girls in secondary education, which fades away in the
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following years, and positive effect for girls in primary education. For the rest of the
estimation, the probit model is consistent with LPM (Tables A.4 A.5).
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Table A.1: Placebo regressions on enrolment status in KPK, 2004-2006.
Currently Enrolled Full sample Age 3-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-18
Female -0.247*** -0.166*** -0.360*** -0.294***
(0.0128) (0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0283)
Age 0.249*** 0.610*** 0.0458 0.240*
(0.00230) (0.0147) (0.0474) (0.142)
Age2 -0.0113*** -0.0359*** -0.00349* -0.00985**
(0.000110) (0.00114) (0.00197) (0.00429)
Hh size -0.00104** -0.00246*** -0.00866*** -0.00270***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000913)
Married -0.223*** -0.110* -0.250***
(0.0117) (0.0621) (0.0131)
Urban 0.0809*** 0.0831*** 0.102*** 0.0650***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Father education 0.0180*** 0.0162*** 0.0220*** 0.0247***
(0.000447) (0.000699) (0.000882) (0.00101)
Mother education 0.0189*** 0.0216*** 0.0206*** 0.0292***
(0.000852) (0.00132) (0.00215) (0.00202)
Parents monthly income 6.22e-07*** -8.81e-08 5.62e-07 2.72e-06***
(2.29e-07) (2.98e-07) (5.91e-07) (8.65e-07)
Year 2005-06 -0.0277** -0.0201 -0.00638 -0.0683**
(0.0127) (0.0205) (0.0261) (0.0283)
Year 2006-07 0.0357*** 0.0373** -0.001 0.0306
(0.00999) (0.0161) (0.02) (0.0227)
High Intensity 0.0516*** 0.124*** 0.0477 -0.0176
(0.0163) (0.0255) (0.0335) (0.0363)
Low Intensity 0.0175 0.0885*** -0.0175 -0.0287
(0.0148) (0.0243) (0.0304) (0.0329)
Female*High Intensity -0.0412* -0.0889** -0.0252 -0.0401
(0.0235) (0.0363) (0.0460) (0.0543)
Female*Low Intensity 0.0135 0.00345 -0.000791 0.0262
(0.0223) (0.0358) (0.0403) (0.0502)
Year 2005-06*High -0.00804 -0.0850*** -0.00685 0.0964*
(0.0213) (0.0317) (0.0459) (0.0511)
Year 2005-06*Low 0.0370 0.00957 0.0188 0.141***
(0.0227) (0.0361) (0.0442) (0.0541)
Year 2006-07*High -0.0392** -0.114*** -0.0277 0.0336
(0.0174) (0.0264) (0.0382) (0.0407)
Year 2007-06*Low -0.0399** -0.0758*** -0.0237 -0.0444
(0.0165) (0.0264) (0.0349) (0.0366)
Year 2005-06*Female 0.0439** 0.0415 0.0186 0.111**
(0.0199) (0.0318) (0.0340) (0.0460)
Year 2006-07*Female 0.0228 0.0220 0.0347 -0.00327
(0.0154) (0.0247) (0.0264) (0.0339)
Year 2005-06*Female*Low -0.0291 -0.0616 0.0700 -0.126**
(0.0321) (0.0510) (0.0532) (0.0632)
Year 2005-06*Female*High 0.0228 0.0907* 0.0408 -0.0877
(0.0324) (0.0521) (0.0558) (0.0663)
Year 2006-07*Female*Low 0.0351 0.0161 0.0593 0.0799
(0.0260) (0.0414) (0.0419) (0.0582)
Year 2006-07*Female*High -0.0118 0.0505 -0.0461 -0.0211
(0.0265) (0.0431) (0.0513) (0.0604)
Observations 79,233 32,376 20,484 15,186
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Table A.2: Placebo regressions on enrolment status in Swat and Peshawar, 2004-2006.
Enrolment status Swat Peshawar
Female -0.230*** -0.335***
(0.021) (0.023)
Year 2005-06 -0.0276 -0.0597
(0.026) (0.042)
Year 2005-06*Female 0.0196 0.0997
(0.038) (0.071)
Age 0.268*** 0.220***
(0.010) (0.013)
Age2 -0.0120*** -0.0107***
(0.001) (0.001)
Hh size -0.00139 0.00396
(0.002) (0.004)
Married -0.235*** -0.0389
(0.046) (0.079)
First born -0.0181 0.0555
(0.029) (0.037)
Urban 0.0189
(0.021)
Father education 0.0155*** 0.0214***
(0.002) (0.003)
Mother education 0.0109*** 0.0311***
(0.004) (0.009)
Father log income 7.05e-05 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Mother log income 0.0026 0.001
(0.005) (0.007)
Observations 3,895 2,104
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Table A.3: Placebo regressions on enrolment status in religious schools, 2004-2006.
Madrassa enrolment Girls Boys
Year 2005-06*High intensity -0.0171*** -0.0133***
(0.003) (0.002)
Year 2005-06*Low Intensity -0.00343 -0.00413
(0.004) (0.003)
Age 0.0011 -0.0002
(0.002) (0.001)
Age2 -5.27e-06 4.09e-05
(9.76e-05) (6.87e-05)
Hh size 4.71e-05 -0.00014
(0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.0138
(0.0200)
First born 0.0088 0.0088**
(0.005) (0.004)
Urban -0.0153*** -0.0068***
(0.004) (0.002)
Father education 0.00054 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Mother education -0.0016*** -0.0010**
(0.001) (0.001)
Father log income 0.00073*** 0.00026
(0.000236) (0.000165)
Mother log income 0.0009* -0.0005
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 8,547 14,867
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Table A.4: LPM regressions on enrolment status in KPK, 2004-2009.
Currently Enrolled Full sample Age 3-9 Age 10-14 Age 15-18
Female -0.175*** -0.247*** -0.107*** -0.317***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Age 0.172*** 0.319*** 0.372*** 0.0738**
(0.001) (0.093) (0.006) (0.0314)
Age2 -0.00787*** -0.0119*** -0.0195*** -0.00452***
(4.29e-05) (0.003) (0.005) (0.00131)
Hh size -0.00156*** -0.00110* -0.00187*** -0.00611***
(0.000242) (0.000620) (0.000357) (0.000522)
Married -0.215*** -0.166*** -0.434*** -0.0901*
(0.00645) (0.00747) (0.144) (0.0503)
First born -0.00337 -0.00310 -0.00162 -0.00319
(0.00375) (0.00691) (0.00655) (0.00648)
Urban 0.0612*** 0.0690*** 0.0549*** 0.0901***
(0.00284) (0.00698) (0.00437) (0.00555)
Father years education 0.0141*** 0.0224*** 0.0118*** 0.0190***
(0.000245) (0.000609) (0.000375) (0.000474)
Mother years education 0.0116*** 0.0237*** 0.0123*** 0.0105***
(0.000422) (0.00107) (0.000646) (0.000803)
Father log income -0.00292*** -0.00309*** -0.00357*** -0.00339***
(0.000181) (0.000444) (0.000279) (0.000362)
Mother log income 0.00219*** 0.00287** 0.00117* 0.00365***
(0.000450) (0.00112) (0.000699) (0.000866)
Year 2007-08 -0.0209** 0.0122 -0.00223 -0.0516***
(0.00879) (0.0240) (0.0132) (0.0174)
Year 2008-09 0.0468*** 0.0684*** 0.0525*** 0.0643***
(0.00459) (0.0124) (0.00700) (0.00828)
High intensity 0.0110** 0.0243* 0.00509 0.0164*
(0.00505) (0.0136) (0.00768) (0.00937)
Low intensity -0.00178 -0.0334** 0.0258*** -0.0291***
(0.00571) (0.0148) (0.00888) (0.0108)
Year 2007-08*High 0.0468*** 0.0181 0.0443** 0.0863***
(0.0122) (0.0331) (0.0181) (0.0232)
Year 2007-08*Low 0.0434*** 0.0270 0.0185 0.115***
(0.0147) (0.0399) (0.0224) (0.0288)
Year 2008-09*High -0.00898 -0.0186 -0.0119 0.00335
(0.00745) (0.0201) (0.0114) (0.0131)
Year 2008-09*Low -0.0127 -0.00921 -0.0299** -0.0140
(0.00834) (0.0216) (0.0128) (0.0150)
Female*High Intensity -0.0318*** -0.0603*** -0.0225* -0.0447***
(0.00746) (0.0177) (0.0115) (0.0153)
Female*Low Intensity 0.0302*** 0.0529*** 0.00368 0.0719***
(0.00835) (0.0197) (0.0130) (0.0169)
Year 2007-08*Fem 0.0321** 0.0183 0.00995 0.0719***
(0.0127) (0.0316) (0.0198) (0.0267)
Year 2008-09*Female -0.0248*** -0.0420** -0.0258** -0.0238*
(0.007) (0.017) (0.011) (0.0141)
Year 2007-08*Fem*High 0.0258 0.0284 0.0340 0.0257
(0.0180) (0.0446) (0.0276) (0.0369)
Year 2007-08*Fem*Low -0.0830*** -0.0949* -0.0155 -0.187***
(0.021) (0.054) (0.034) (0.0448)
Year 2008-09*Fem*Low 0.0120 0.0148 0.0449** -0.00605
(0.013) (0.029) (0.019) (0.0248)
Year 2008-09*Fem*High 0.0158 0.0123 0.0271 0.0123
(0.011) (0.027) (0.017) (0.0228)
Constant -0.181*** -1.525** -0.951*** 0.586***
(0.005) (0.767) (0.015) (0.185)
Observations 127,768 24,614 52,537 33,282
R-squared 0.336 0.240 0.354 0.206
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Table A.5: LPM regressions on enrolment status in Swat and Peshawar, 2004-2009.
Enrolment status Swat Peshawar
Female -0.162*** -0.274***
(0.013) (0.018)
Year 2007-08 0.0812*** 0.0302
(0.019) (0.023)
Year 2008-09 -0.0200 0.0220
(0.018) (0.019)
Year 2007-08*Female -0.0393 0.0447
(0.029) (0.032)
Year 2008-09*Female -0.0283 -0.0350
(0.026) (0.027)
Age 0.171*** 0.158***
(0.003) (0.004)
Age2 -0.0077*** -0.0078***
(0.001) (0.001)
Hh size -0.00119 0.00342**
(0.001) (0.001)
Married -0.264*** -0.0536
(0.027) (0.039)
First born -0.0118 0.0620***
(0.0185) (0.020)
Urban 0.0669***
(0.011)
Father education 0.0113*** 0.0167***
(0.001) (0.001)
Mother education 0.0075*** 0.0172***
(0.002) (0.003)
Father log income -0.00165** -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
motherlogincome -0.000536 0.00131
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant -0.208*** -0.150***
(0.020) (0.028)
Observations 6,048 4,676
R-squared 0.344 0.321
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Table A.6: LPM regressions on enrolment status in religious schools, 2004-2009.
Madrassa enrolment Girls Boys
Year 2007-08 -0.00410 0.0144***
(0.005) (0.005)
Year 2008-09 -0.00597** 0.00315*
(0.002) (0.002)
Year 2007-08*High Intensity -0.0105** -0.0274***
(0.005) (0.005)
Year 2007-08*Low Intensity 0.00860 -0.0193***
(0.008) (0.006)
Year 2008-09*High Intensity -0.00907*** -0.0125***
(0.003) (0.002)
Year 2008-09*Low Intensity -0.00132 -0.00660***
(0.003) (0.002)
Age -0.00023 0.00021
(0.001) (0.001)
Age2 7.11e-05 4.43e-05
(0.001) (0.001)
Hh size -0.000198 -0.000296***
(0.000136) (0.000104)
Married -0.0283*** 0.0428
(0.003) (0.027)
First born 0.00384 0.00433**
(0.003) (0.002)
Urban -0.0101*** -0.00828***
(0.002) (0.001)
Father education 0.000224 -0.000318**
(0.001) (0.001)
Mother education -0.000754*** -0.000476**
(0.001) (0.001)
Father log income 0.00032** 0.00034***
(0.001) (0.001)
Mother log income 0.00034 -0.00027
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.0155** 0.0101*
(0.007) (0.005)
Observations 21,882 37,197
R-squared 0.005 0.005
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B.1 Placebo Test:
In order to ensure that the estimates reflect the impact of terrorism only, a series of
falsification tests, similar to the tests in chapter 2, are performed. I artificially reassign
the terrorism period to the years 2004 to 2006, each of the 3 years not directly exposed
to terrorism. If the years 2007-08 and 2008-09 heavily experienced terrorism and other
years did not, the expectation is that the high and low intensity districts in unexposed
years should not be affected by terrorism, thus should not yield a decreasing probability
of employment in those years. Therefore, confidence in estimates that they reflects
the effect of terrorism would be severely undermined if similar negative estimates are
obtained when terrorism is artificially assigned to years not directly exposed to terrorism.
The difference-in-difference-in-difference was run for a time period in the before years
from 2004 to 2006 to perform a falsification placebo. Two-year treatment period (years
2005-06 and 2006-07) and one-year control period (year 2004-05) were created to conduct
a placebo test, asking whether the false years predict the change in employment as well
as the true ones. Table B.2 shows that in the pre-treatment period for the regression for
overall employment, and employment types of paid work, self employment, farm work
and unpaid work.
Placebo for employment chapter shows that in the year immediately before the terror-
ist attacks, employment for women has increasing rates in overall employment. In the
survey year 2006-07 (preceding the actual treatment years), the difference-indifference-
in-difference estimate for the probability of employment for women increases to 7 percent.
In types of work regressions, the positive effect is only present for farm work and un-
paid work, meaning that before the increase in terrorist activities, women were mostly
engaged in farm work and unpaid work.
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Linear Probability model:
Following the discusson on interaction terms for probit in appenxix A, I rerun the regres-
sions using the Linear Probability Model instead of the probit using the same variables
as a further robustness check for the probit estimates for this paper. The results for the
regressions of employmet rates (Table B.5) are consistent with the probit estimates in
sign and magnitude of the interaction terms. For the rest of the estimation, the probit
model is consistent with LPM (tables B.6, B.7 B.8 ).
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Table B.1: Placebo regression for full sample by employment type, Years 2004-2006
Full sample Any work Paid emp Self emp Farm work Unpaid work
Age 0.0226*** 0.00770*** 0.00254*** 0.00133*** 0.00377***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.00028*** -9.97e-05*** -3.01e-05*** -1.14e-05*** -5.14e-05***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hh size -0.00862*** -0.00156*** 0.000723*** -0.000518*** -0.000999***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0013) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban -0.0146*** 0.0107*** 0.0130*** -0.0172*** -0.0119***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.199*** -0.106*** -0.0420*** -0.0274*** -0.0176***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Years in education 0.0113*** 0.00449*** 0.00117*** -0.000615*** 0.000899***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.247*** 0.0391*** 0.0317*** 0.0160*** -0.0167***
(0.00602) (0.00244) (0.00202) (0.00147) (0.00113)
Children in hh 0.00608*** 9.00e-05 -0.000589*** 0.000749*** -2.35e-05
(0.00011) (0.001) (0.0015) (0.001) (0.001)
Father education -0.00725*** -0.00173*** -0.000694*** -0.000477*** -0.00147***
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother education -0.00367*** -0.000558*** -0.000362*** -0.000748*** -0.000788***
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parents monthly income 2.96e-07*** -3.96e-07*** 8.88e-08*** -1.20e-07*** 1.28e-07***
(9.49e-08) (1.25e-07) (2.33e-08) (4.47e-08) (2.09e-08)
Family members work 0.0254*** 0.00306*** -0.000648** 0.000280 0.00843***
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family workers*Female 0.0171*** 0.00680*** 0.00325*** -0.000212 0.000903***
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father edu*Fem 0.000798 0.00112*** -0.000212 -0.000789*** -0.000179
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother edu*Fem 0.00502*** 0.00323*** -0.000181 0.00132*** -0.00124***
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parents income*Female 0.00498*** 0.00142*** 0.000843*** 0.00147*** 0.000895***
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married*Female -0.200*** -0.0524*** -0.0282*** -0.0145*** 0.0154***
(0.0012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
High Intensity 0.0107 0.00434 0.0100*** -0.00784*** -0.00348
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Low intensity 0.0107 0.000261 0.00825*** -0.00621*** 0.00268
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Female*High Intensity -0.0877*** -0.00226 -0.00528 -0.00998*** -0.0248***
(0.00944) (0.00716) (0.00551) (0.00255) (0.00202)
Female*Low Intensity -0.0476*** 0.00610 -0.000481 -0.00166 -0.0135***
(0.011 (0.008 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Year 2005-06*Female 0.101*** 0.00826 0.00844 0.00156 0.0230***
(0.021 (0.012 (0.011 (0.00343) (0.007
Year 2006-07*Female 0.0182 0.0148** 0.0165** 0.00358 0.00212
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2005-06*High -0.0200* 0.0164** -0.00666** 0.00436 -0.00433
(0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2006-07*High 0.0245*** 0.00138 -0.00453** 0.0109*** 0.00653**
(0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2005-06*Low -0.0155 0.0215*** -0.00532* 0.00172 -0.00726***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Year 2006-07*Low 0.0183** 0.00348 -0.00452** 0.00950*** 0.00238
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Year 2005-06*Female*High -0.0328** -0.0132 0.00948 0.00345 0.0124
(0.016) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
Year 2005-06*Female*Low -0.0642*** -0.00861 -0.00260 -0.00538** -0.00954***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.0025) (0.003)
Year 2006-07*Female*High 0.0669*** 0.00291 -0.00120 0.0250* 0.0241**
(0.020) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)
Year 2006-07*Female*Low 0.00533 -0.00545 -0.00460 0.000728 -0.00123
(0.015) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 143,456 143,456 143,456 143,456 143,456
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.5: LPM regressions on employment status in KPK, 2004-2009.
Full sample Any work Paid emp Self emp Farm work Unpaid work
Age 0.0200*** 0.0101*** 0.00342*** 0.00342*** 0.00506***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000162) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000256*** -0.000144*** -4.75e-05*** -2.47e-05*** -6.51e-05***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Hh size -0.00764*** -0.00362*** 0.000190 -0.000603*** -0.00145***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban -0.00992*** 0.0119*** 0.0230*** -0.0335*** -0.0185***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.106*** -0.0549*** -0.0101*** -0.0507*** -0.00557**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Years education 0.00885*** 0.0105*** 0.00173*** -0.00447*** 0.00105***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.472*** 0.235*** 0.153*** 0.0956*** -0.0302***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Children in household 0.00519*** 0.00101*** 0.000238 0.000743*** 0.000242
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father education -0.00528*** -0.00105*** -0.000570*** -0.00224*** -0.00305***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother education -0.00239*** -0.000382 0.000218 -0.00179*** -0.00125***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parents monthly income 2.12e-08 -7.74e-07*** 4.10e-07*** 3.29e-08 6.78e-07***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family members work 0.0228*** 0.00853*** -0.00351*** -0.00352*** 0.0201***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
family work*Fem 0.00564*** 0.00116 0.00461*** 0.00330*** -0.00495***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Father edu*Fem 0.00217*** 0.000103 -0.000249* 0.00191*** 0.000885***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother edu*Fem 0.00390*** 0.00172*** -0.00145*** 0.00411*** -0.000202
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parents income*Fem 0.00277*** 0.00142*** 6.90e-05 0.00157*** 0.00106***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married*Female -0.608*** -0.290*** -0.174*** -0.142*** 0.0123***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year 2007-08 0.0821*** -0.0168* 0.00893 -0.0109 0.104***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Year 2008-09 0.000112 -0.00163 -0.00226 0.00745** -0.0189***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
High Intensity 0.0286*** 0.0168*** 0.0165*** -0.0124*** -0.00504**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Low Intensity 0.0262*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** -0.00634** 0.00228
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
2007-08*Female 0.0345*** 0.0215** -0.0118** 0.00802 0.00216
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
2008-09*Female -0.0433*** -0.000297 -0.00496 -0.00775** 0.00961***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female*High Intensity -0.0533*** -0.0113*** -0.0195*** 0.0122*** -0.0313***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female*Low Intensity -0.0511*** -0.00723* -0.0130*** 0.00338 -0.0323***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2007-08*High Intensity -0.0198** 0.00845 -0.0104* -0.0217*** 0.0152**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.00) (0.007) (0.006)
Year 2008-09*High Intensity 0.00181 0.0164*** -0.00210 -0.00242 -0.0141***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
2007-08*Low Intensity -0.0208** 0.0348*** -0.00564 -0.0342*** -0.0102
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Year 2008-09*Low Intensity 0.000509 0.00777 -0.00105 0.00713* -0.00520
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Year 2007-08*Fem*High -0.0935*** -0.00673 0.00742 0.0165** -0.113***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Year 2007-08*Fem*Low -0.0751*** -0.0296*** 0.00374 0.0319*** -0.0815***
(0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Year 2008-09*Fem*High 0.008 -0.0205*** 0.001 -0.00595 0.0219***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
2008-09*Fem*Low 0.00883 -0.0124** 0.001 -0.0122*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 257,180 257,180 257,180 257,180 257,180
R-squared 0.495 0.249 0.130 0.125 0.053
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Appendix C
Chapter 4
C.1 Heckman Two-Step method
One common approach to the SSB problem is Heckman’s two-step estimator, also known
simply as the Heckman. This approach involves estimation of a probit model for selec-
tion, followed by the insertion of a correction factor—the inverse Mills ratio, calculated
from the probit model—into the second OLS model of interest.
The Heckman two-step method is used to correct for this sample selection bias. In the
first step of the process, the probit model for employment is estimated for all observations
in the sample. Then, the estimates are used to construct the inverse Mills ratio. In the
second step, the earning function is estimated by OLS with all the independent variables
from the initial earning function, as well as the selectivity term λ.
Step 1 - Estimation probit model of employment type: Z is exogenous in the earning
function E(u/X,Z)=0. X is a subset of Z, that is, there is at least one more variable in
the employment decision equation. By using all the observations of those participating
in employment type as well as those who are not, estimate the probit of employment
type on Zi and obtain γ to compute the inverse mills ratio, λ(Ziγ)
(Type of Employment)D = Zih γ + errorih
Step 2 - Estimation of corrected earning function: OLS is then used to estimate the
corrected wages for the entire sample. Estimated coefficients would now be unbiased
and consistent. The null hypothesis is tested for ρ = 0 for sample selection bias.
(Log income)ih = α1 +Xih β2 + ρ γ (Zih γ) + errorih
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The decision to enter paid employment / self employment (selection equation) is mod-
elled using the selection equation:
Zi = α1 + β1(Xi) + β2(Wi) + ηi
where Zi is an index of paid employment or self employment propensity, Xi is a vector
of worker characteristics from the earnings regressions. Wi is a vector of characteristics
which influence sector choice which are excluded from the earnings equations
For sample of workers in the different categories of employment, the extent of variation in
wages amongst ethnic/religious groups can be established by estimating the traditional
Heckman-Mincerian wage regressions. The estimation is done separately for each type
of employment by ethnic group.
ln wagei = α1 + β1 (xi) + β2 (Ei) + β3 (Ri) + β4 (EiRi) + ξ1i
where ln-wage is log of earnings for worker i, α1 is the constant term, Ei is a vector of
ethnicity dummies. Xi is the vector of personal characteristics of each worker i which are
standard for estimate earning equations. The sign and significance of β2 tells us whether
a particular group has an earnings advantage when compared to another excluded group.
In order to account for geographical differences, vector of region dummies Ri is added.
Then, to investigate whether returns associated with region vary across ethnicity, an
interaction term for ethnicity and region EiRi is added to the model.
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